MAL-2026-10023

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-10023

MAL-2026-10023

Summary: Malicious code in @wagni_bot/bsc-sdk (npm)

Details: The npm package `@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **BNB Smart Chain (BSC)** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09. Each package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user's home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal. codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch). Source: amazon-inspector (68707229cc80d6db8fe3b087a40601cdbd8b23bcda9a3030ede4e0ac85fe0cf8) @wagni_bot/[email protected] is a typosquat of BSC-SDK-family packages whose sole purpose is credential theft at install time. index.js exports an empty object; the package provides no advertised BNB Smart Chain functionality. The postinstall lifecycle script recursively scans the current working directory, the user's home directory, and ~/.ssh for files matching id_rsa, id_ed25519, *.pem, *.key, *.cred, and.env, and POSTs their contents to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://107.161.90.180:7777. In parallel, it enumerates process.env for keys containing PRIVATE, SECRET, TOKEN, API_KEY, PASSWORD, MNEMONIC, SEED, WALLET, or AWS and transmits the matching key=value pairs along with hostname, username, and cwd to the same endpoint. The destination is a plaintext HTTP bare IP on a non-standard port, consistent with throwaway stealer infrastructure. Every developer and CI runner that runs `npm install` on this package has their SSH private keys, PEM certificates, and credential-shaped environment variables shipped to the attacker.

References: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk/v/1.2.0, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk/v/1.1.3, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk/v/1.1.1, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk/v/1.1.4, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk/v/1.1.0, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk/v/1.1.5, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk/v/1.0.0, https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3017-wagni-bsc-sdk, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk/v/1.1.2