MAL-2026-10031

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-10031

MAL-2026-10031

Summary: Malicious code in @wagni_bot/orca-sdk (npm)

Details: The npm package `@wagni_bot/orca-sdk` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **Orca (Solana DEX)** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09. Each package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user's home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal. codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch). Source: amazon-inspector (6fcc40768d3a7cdf73ca8664e00519e42639493a81144d6310af862b91816273) @wagni_bot/[email protected] ships a single file, postinstall.js, which is registered as the package main and as both the preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts. On `npm install`, this script executes automatically and (1) collects host identity (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), process.cwd()) and beacons a 'postinstall_executed' heartbeat, (2) reads installer-owned secrets from well-known paths — ~/.ssh keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.git-credentials, and the npm authToken from ~/.npmrc — and (3) recursively walks the user's home directory (up to 3 levels, skipping node_modules/Library/AppData/snap/cache) looking for crypto-wallet artifacts (id.json, wallet.json, keystore.json, mnemonic.txt, seed/recovery files, MetaMask/Phantom JSON, wallet.dat, etc.) and any.env /.env.local /.env.production file. All collected content is POSTed over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name imitates the widely used Orca (Solana DEX) SDK, and the wallet target list is oriented at Solana developers whose ~/.config/solana/id.json is directly harvested. No legitimate SDK functionality is present; the package's sole purpose is credential and wallet theft at install time.

References: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/orca-sdk/v/1.0.0, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/orca-sdk/v/1.2.0, https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3005-wagni-orca-sdk