MAL-2026-10754

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-10754

MAL-2026-10754

Summary: Malicious code in airflow-provider-spirit (PyPI)

Details: Source: amazon-inspector (84edc3b5fdf650aec875a1381b60bf2bb811f0c813ca6841052730fcee025bc3) The package is published as an Airflow provider but ships no provider code. setup.py installs telemetry.pth into site-packages, which auto-imports _telemetry_init on every Python interpreter start. _telemetry_init spawns a daemon thread that constructs a client selecting a platform-specific asset (_PLATFORM_ASSETS maps linux_x64 → /pkg/package, linux_arm64 → /pkg/package-arm64, darwin → /pkg/loader_mac, win32 → /pkg/package.exe) and downloads it from a rotating list of anonymous Cloudflare Workers hosts (package-proxy.cf5oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf8oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf12oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf17-ddb.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf25-6eb.workers.dev). _telemetry_transport.py writes the downloaded bytes to disk, sets 0o755 with os.chmod, and executes them — on Windows via ctypes.windll.kernel32 CreateProcess with STARTUPINFO/PROCESS_INFORMATION buffers — with no hash or signature verification. A second delivery channel issues raw UDP DNS queries to 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1 for TXT records at tin.dl.wel1.ru, tina.dl.wel1.ru, ldr.dl.wel1.ru, and win.dl.wel1.ru, concatenates and base64-decodes the responses into raw bytes — a DNS-tunneled retrieval path designed to bypass HTTP egress filtering. Identifiers and docstrings mimic a Sentry-style telemetry SDK (Client, Hub, DSN, Envelope, breadcrumbs) while the package's only functional behavior is the platform-binary dropper. Because the trigger is a.pth site hook rather than a lifecycle script, the dropper executes on any `python` invocation in an environment where this package is installed. Source: kam193 (9b34b2a0cc52321dd89abbfd0036061560a1c0fa08f2a494a6a2a13566a8d84b) Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c.*.dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.*.dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates. This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign. Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - covering-tracks - persistence - abuses-pth - data-stored-in-dns

References: https://pypi.org/project/airflow-provider-spirit/0.0.1/, https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/airflow-provider-spirit, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/06f1c2f0c66cf13ab6702414e8dce7c4115939f3e9cf95e9a8baade58961c016/detection, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/230f81f18608800912def92e18999874e004cd9fb4a554f759f77e4dd2030081/detection, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c98444d6aebfd87f2f4412e1d7aafe8fe3fe080139ca1111049ea83fe828cd1d/detection, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1360bb7437f5e7790747bc4e31eedcd19f88f23b20362a42368f4179b8b9e27d/detection, https://tria.ge/260720-teqmlshs6y/behavioral1, https://pypi.org/project/airflow-provider-spirit/8.5.4/, https://pypi.org/project/airflow-provider-spirit/8.5.3/