MAL-2026-10757

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-10757

MAL-2026-10757

Summary: Malicious code in dde-common (PyPI)

Details: Source: amazon-inspector (f875cacd68379cbaaa066adac089dc3c403fd532a0e73ba932cf35e0562ff476) setup.py installs a telemetry.pth file into site-packages containing `import _telemetry_init`, which causes Python's site.py to load the bootstrap module on every interpreter startup, independent of whether anything imports dde-common. _telemetry_init spawns a daemon thread that selects a platform-specific asset path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe) and fetches an opaque native binary from a rotation of Cloudflare Workers hosts (package-proxy.cf5oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf8oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf12oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf17-ddb.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf25-6eb.workers.dev). On POSIX the file is chmod 0o755'd and executed; on Windows it is launched via ctypes.windll.kernel32 CreateProcess with STARTUPINFO/PROCESS_INFORMATION. A DNS-TXT covert channel provides a fallback distribution path: custom UDP queries to 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1 retrieve numbered TXT chunks from tin/tina/ldr/win.dl.well1.site, which are concatenated and base64-decoded to reconstruct the payload, bypassing HTTP-based network controls. Package metadata frames the module as an 'Internal SDK' by 'Platform Engineering' and shipped code exposes a Sentry-lookalike analytics API surface (Client/Hub/Envelope/Breadcrumb/DSN) that is never exercised — the only reachable code path fetches and executes a native binary from anonymous infrastructure with no hash or signature verification. Source: kam193 (c0eb18950d3479b8ce79d01c50f1eaf3e56373dd8b66feef0d4aa8d12f78f528) Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c.*.dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.*.dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates. This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign. Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - covering-tracks - persistence - abuses-pth - data-stored-in-dns

References: https://pypi.org/project/dde-common/0.0.1/, https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/dde-common, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/06f1c2f0c66cf13ab6702414e8dce7c4115939f3e9cf95e9a8baade58961c016/detection, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/230f81f18608800912def92e18999874e004cd9fb4a554f759f77e4dd2030081/detection, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c98444d6aebfd87f2f4412e1d7aafe8fe3fe080139ca1111049ea83fe828cd1d/detection, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1360bb7437f5e7790747bc4e31eedcd19f88f23b20362a42368f4179b8b9e27d/detection, https://tria.ge/260720-teqmlshs6y/behavioral1, https://pypi.org/project/dde-common/8.5.3/, https://pypi.org/project/dde-common/8.5.4/