MAL-2026-11569

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11569

MAL-2026-11569

Summary: Malicious code in @nebula.js/locale (npm)

Details: npm/@nebula.js/locale is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (096ee1a09409177dc266d72649cfc3da0cde7b42f4a30dc3a717ad41276e0a0f) The package ships a `preinstall` hook (`node setup.mjs`) that downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/ into a temp directory, chmods it executable, and uses it via `execFileSync` to run a sibling file `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a 728KB single-line, heavily obfuscated blob using hex-mangled identifiers (`_0xNNNN`), a rotating string-array (`WV8StW` shift routine), and an opaque numeric/character table. Routing execution through a freshly downloaded alternate runtime bypasses Node-based supply-chain scanners that only trace the Node module graph. The `package.json` presents the package as `@nebula.js/locale` by `QlikTech International AB` with repo `qlik-oss/nebula.js`, but the upstream qlik-oss/nebula.js source tree contains neither `setup.mjs` nor `math_init.js` nor a `preinstall` script — the dropper machinery is grafted onto legitimate-looking Qlik metadata to impersonate the qlik-oss scope. Installing this version triggers automatic execution of concealed code on the installer's machine on `npm install`. Source: ghsa-malware (37c196805964d8a08fe0fed3fe023fdc59db5988750a1e3f0fd8c51d82dd0e86) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nebula.js/locale, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gf29-rwf4-2q85, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nebula.js/locale/v/0.6.2