MAL-2026-11572

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MAL-2026-11572

Summary: Malicious code in @nebula.js/sn-animator (npm)

Details: npm/@nebula.js/sn-animator is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (38e095f8b3e20de9cdb38aa98004d690909d7cd0b81f6c7ea01fa3411e9376b7) The package's preinstall hook runs setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime (bun-v1.3.13) from oven-sh's GitHub release archive for the installer's platform/arch, extracts it, marks it executable, and then invokes the freshly downloaded Bun binary against a sibling file math_init.js shipped in the tarball. math_init.js is a ~727KB single-line, heavily obfuscated `@bun`/`@bun-cjs`-tagged bundle using a rotated string-array cipher and hex-index literal decoder, so the actual executed behavior is only realized inside the alternate runtime and not visible to Node-based tooling. Both setup.mjs and math_init.js are shipped in the tarball but are not declared in the package.json `files` array. The manifest presents the package as the QlikTech `@nebula.js/sn-animator` Qlik visualization library, whose legitimate releases do not ship a preinstall script, a Bun downloader, or a math_init.js bundle. The install-time behavior therefore executes attacker-controlled obfuscated code on the installer's machine via a second language runtime as a direct consequence of `npm install`, matching the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern. Source: ghsa-malware (34200514e9aefe4270a232d943b4f8bde772165725d8afb1ec7ad750c99a827b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nebula.js/sn-animator, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4854-qcwp-jmgj, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nebula.js/sn-animator/v/2.13.1