MAL-2026-11575

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11575

MAL-2026-11575

Summary: Malicious code in @nebula.js/sn-line-chart (npm)

Details: npm/@nebula.js/sn-line-chart is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (dfcb88e744d376840cf22b59f2ac9b026f903e100d9e8d7674cd8d7d58ba0d99) Package @nebula.js/[email protected] declares a `preinstall` script (`node setup.mjs`) that downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases for the host platform, extracts it to a temporary directory, marks it executable, and invokes it against the sibling file `math_init.js` (falling back to a system `bun` if present). `math_init.js` is a 727 KB single-line, string-array-rotated obfuscated bundle (opening marker `// @bun @bun-cjs`, `WV8StW` rotator function, large mixed number/string constant table; sha256 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc) whose name is unrelated to the package's declared purpose as a Qlik line-chart supernova. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: installing a second language runtime at preinstall specifically to execute an opaque, heavily obfuscated bundle bypasses tooling that only audits Node-resolved code, and the payload contents are not human-inspectable without deobfuscation. A charting supernova has no legitimate need to fetch a separate runtime and hand it an obfuscated 727 KB blob at install time. Source: ghsa-malware (ae682cb2ec061c04df291645729cc4cfadbaf950bf0c53f5bfe56d10fc54bd9a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nebula.js/sn-line-chart, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jvxf-3873-cvcw, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nebula.js/sn-line-chart/v/2.7.1