MAL-2026-11582

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11582

MAL-2026-11582

Summary: Malicious code in @nebula.js/sn-tabbed-container (npm)

Details: npm/@nebula.js/sn-tabbed-container is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (ffe84d7c4e4c2126cff5aec3e6b0fc5fbe9bab0f49c906ccf81d963385412c71) This package's preinstall script (setup.mjs) is obfuscated with obfuscator.io-style `_0x` identifier mangling and per-call string-property maps to hide `execFileSync`, `https.get`, `fs.writeFileSync`, `chmod`, and unzip operations. On `npm install` the script checks for a local `bun` binary and, if absent, downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it 0755, and uses that Bun binary to `execFileSync` a sibling file `math_init.js` — a 727 KB `// @bun @bun-cjs` compiled bundle whose contents are further obfuscated with a shuffled numeric/string constant table and a string-array rotator function. The declared package purpose is a Qlik/Nebula.js tabbed-container chart component, which has no functional need for an alternate JavaScript runtime or a large opaque init payload. The result is that installing the package auto-executes attacker-controlled bytecode under a runtime outside the Node inspection path, at install time, with the identity of the installing user. Source: ghsa-malware (e4289bd5d907e23556f344840185b1eaedf4bfa3df7d4b33c18cab2bb31ba2ab) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nebula.js/sn-tabbed-container, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-96g8-5qg3-gwpp, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nebula.js/sn-tabbed-container/v/2.4.1