MAL-2026-11650

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11650

MAL-2026-11650

Summary: Malicious code in @onereach/slack-helpers (npm)

Details: npm/@onereach/slack-helpers is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (559eec9e70f8ecaa7828a3a3010731e87282631a8218f7e1e48af4dc21df11b5) @onereach/[email protected] declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, extracts it to a temporary directory, sets it executable, and invokes it against the sibling file math_init.js during npm install. math_init.js is a ~727KB '// @bun @bun-cjs' bundle using rotating string-array indirection and a large numeric index table decoded through a custom alphabet, with '.aws' substrings present among decoded strings. The payload is only reachable via the Bun runtime installed by the preinstall script and does not participate in the normal Node import graph. A Slack helper library has no legitimate need for a second language runtime, and the delivery pattern — pulling in an unrelated runtime specifically to execute a heavily obfuscated bundle unreadable to Node-oriented tooling — is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape rather than a build-tool integration. Source: ghsa-malware (5d0f0bdad5fb662a6e9ea07b22949dcf82d6d7d57e7badd947d4e51e5ad45a1a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@onereach/slack-helpers, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c8qf-7xhp-qpr9, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@onereach/slack-helpers/v/1.0.5, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@onereach/slack-helpers/v/1.0.3, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@onereach/slack-helpers/v/1.0.4