MAL-2026-11722

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11722

MAL-2026-11722

Summary: Malicious code in @or-sdk/qna (npm)

Details: npm/@or-sdk/qna is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (c80317a35edebc316e4f85b05db8b746ec9a3c84b8ed04a3da6d157c34701b73) The `preinstall` hook in package.json runs `node setup.mjs`. `setup.mjs` is an obfuscator.io-style wrapper (hex-named `_0x...` identifiers, per-function string-lookup tables) that downloads the Bun runtime binary (v1.3.13) from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, unpacks it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes `execFileSync(bunPath, ['math_init.js'])`. The invoked sibling `math_init.js` is a 727KB single-line, heavily obfuscated JavaScript blob shipped in the tarball, using a shuffled global string/number array, array-rotation decoder (`WV8StW`), and mangled identifiers, making its behavior opaque. The payload is executed under the freshly-downloaded Bun runtime rather than Node, which bypasses Node-based install-time sandboxes and scanners. The package advertises itself as a QnA SDK; nothing about that stated purpose requires downloading a separate JavaScript runtime at install to execute an unreadable local blob. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: install-time execution of obfuscated code via an alien runtime, fired automatically on `npm install`. Source: ghsa-malware (5bd9e72c9936684820f9511862724e04b35d829b599d10bde8c56633c2d4e6c6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@or-sdk/qna, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hg4q-qmv8-6g5r, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@or-sdk/qna/v/3.4.2, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@or-sdk/qna/v/3.4.4, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@or-sdk/qna/v/3.4.3