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MAL-2026-11771

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11771

MAL-2026-11771

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @ornikar/repo-config (npm)

Details: npm/@ornikar/repo-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (0959da1ed9e510fc6685601234b3b6b1e69fb2fe32c1ed1668da191afc28b109) @ornikar/[email protected] declares a `preinstall` hook `node setup.mjs` that automatically runs on `npm install`. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime archive from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/` for the current architecture, extracts the `bun` binary to a temporary directory, chmods it executable (mode 0755), and then invokes `execFileSync(bun, ['math_init.js'])` to run a sibling file under the freshly downloaded runtime. The executed sibling `math_init.js` is a 727,680-byte Bun-compiled CJS bundle (header `// @bun @bun-cjs`, sha256 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc) using a string-array rotation cipher (`function WV8StW` performing repeated `push(shift())` rotations over a ~1400-entry constants table) with hex-mangled identifier names. The package's advertised purpose is a shared commitlint/prettier/husky repository configuration, which has no functional need for the Bun runtime, a `math_init.js` file, or a 700 KB obfuscated bundle. Executing an opaque payload under an alien runtime downloaded at install time — chosen because Node-based tooling cannot introspect Bun-compiled bytecode — is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: attacker-benefiting code runs on the installer's machine before any user action, with content that cannot be reviewed statically. Source: ghsa-malware (45c98b53572b028884c04701bbe7d604f2fbbc6051abece6bc41acdcf725c4ff) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @ornikar/repo-config

Purl: pkg:npm/%40ornikar/repo-config

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

15.3.3

15.3.4

15.3.5

15.3.6

15.3.7

15.3.8

15.3.9

15.3.10

15.3.11

15.3.12

15.3.13