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MAL-2026-11777

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11777

MAL-2026-11777

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @ornikar/storybook-config (npm)

Details: npm/@ornikar/storybook-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (2438d4e1d9c610246665697c9f87c52633643fc2763d8bbeaf01d4951dcb4523) package.json declares `preinstall: node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs is obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style `_0x...` identifiers and string-map indirection) and, at install time, downloads the Bun runtime zip from GitHub releases, extracts it to a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against `math_init.js` — a 727 KB heavily obfuscated JavaScript file bundled adjacent to the loader (rotating string-array decoder `WV8StW`, numeric/character constant table, hex-obfuscated identifiers). If Bun is already present on the host, it is invoked directly on `math_init.js`. The package is advertised as a Storybook configuration helper and has no functional need to fetch a language runtime or execute an opaque bundled payload at install time. Running the payload under Bun bypasses Node-based install-time scanners, and the obfuscation of both the loader and the payload prevents inspection of what executes on the installer's machine. This matches the alternate-runtime-dropper shape: the runtime fetch itself is from an official source, but the code that is then executed is the package's own opaque bundled blob whose behavior cannot be audited and whose purpose is inconsistent with the package's stated function. Source: ghsa-malware (3b194ccfe7f2ac7e7816b49c8ee6f37312f4fce6ffdd409533c56a480ce34720) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @ornikar/storybook-config

Purl: pkg:npm/%40ornikar/storybook-config

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

12.1.2

12.1.3

12.1.4

12.1.5

12.1.6

12.1.7

12.1.8

12.1.9

12.1.10