MAL-2026-11788

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MAL-2026-11788

Summary: Malicious code in @qlik/dts-bundler (npm)

Details: npm/@qlik/dts-bundler is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (4eb5153de08646fef58d1cce5a50fe6c6809f81a100b9901ba0c1f39f95507c7) package.json declares `preinstall: node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style `_0xNNNNNN` identifiers and inline string-dictionary wrappers around https.get / zlib.inflateRawSync / execFileSync). At install time it downloads the Bun runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<archive>.zip`, extracts and chmods the `bun` binary in a temp directory, and invokes it against a sibling file `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a 727KB heavily obfuscated blob (string-array rotation via `MmgoCP.push(MmgoCP.shift())`, randomized identifiers, large numeric/string dictionary) that is not listed in `package.json.files` (which declares only `dist`) yet ships in the tarball. Executing the payload under a freshly downloaded alternate runtime bypasses Node-based install-time inspection. package.json additionally aliases `typescript` to `npm:@typescript/typescript6@^6.0.2` and `@typescript/native` to `npm:typescript@^7.0.2` — no official TypeScript majors 6 or 7 exist, so these aliases resolve to lookalike packages pulled into the installer's dependency tree. Behavior does not match a TypeScript declaration bundler.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/dts-bundler, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/dts-bundler/v/2.0.3