MAL-2026-11791

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MAL-2026-11791

Summary: Malicious code in @qlik/embed-svelte (npm)

Details: npm/@qlik/embed-svelte is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (f76d5868fd2e2f24bf49838982d0333e4d08a509b4de1d1643f17072d46ba0e5) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (v1.3.13), extracts it to a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and immediately invokes it against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727KB single-line file with obfuscator.io fingerprints (shuffled string/number array, array-rotation function, hex-named identifiers, @bun-cjs format). setup.mjs itself uses hex-mangled identifiers. Both setup.mjs and math_init.js are absent from the package.json 'files' allow-list ([QlikEmbed.svelte, index.js, CHANGELOG.md]), so the executed payload is shipped outside the author's declared publish surface. The advertised purpose (a Svelte component for embedding Qlik content) does not require a Bun runtime or a 700KB obfuscated init script. Installing this package auto-runs an obfuscated payload under a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime that bypasses Node-based analysis. This shape is consistent with a hijacked or malicious publish of the @qlik/embed-svelte package.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/embed-svelte, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/embed-svelte/v/1.1.4