MAL-2026-11799

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11799

MAL-2026-11799

Summary: Malicious code in @qlik/oxfmt-config (npm)

Details: npm/@qlik/oxfmt-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (bb91d39ea81fd4eb7a434735b762a464ed6b862ddad8a2ea166bfbcfdb747a8f) The package advertises itself as a small shared oxfmt formatter config but its declared preinstall hook (`node setup.mjs`) downloads the Bun runtime v1.3.13 from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, extracts it to a temp directory, marks it executable, and invokes it to run a sibling file `math_init.js` (727 KB) at the tarball root. Both `setup.mjs` and `math_init.js` are heavily obfuscated: setup.mjs uses obfuscator.io-style `_0xNNNNNN` identifiers with per-function key-remapping objects that hide identifiers such as `execFileSync`, `unzip`, `powershell`, and the Bun download URL; math_init.js is a Bun-compiled CJS bundle with a rotated string-array decoder (`WV8StW` shifter, ~1300-entry constants table, custom base64 alphabet). No hash or signature check is performed on the downloaded runtime, and `math_init.js` has no relationship to the package's declared purpose. If a `bun` binary is already present in PATH it is used to execute `math_init.js` directly. The alternate-runtime-dropper shape (execute an opaque bundle under a freshly-downloaded second language runtime) bypasses normal Node/npm inspection and is the canonical shape of an install-time supply-chain attack. Source: ghsa-malware (32c148ab1246c3f8e02e2cd794c871b9e99c73281b916ec45cb747c0af361240) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/oxfmt-config, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h76x-85h7-6jgw, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/oxfmt-config/v/0.1.6