MAL-2026-11800

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11800

MAL-2026-11800

Summary: Malicious code in @qlik/oxlint-config (npm)

Details: npm/@qlik/oxlint-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (809bf6eaa1ba78347a46f71142cfc8e3c5cab9d8d97afb434330a0106eef369a) The package's preinstall lifecycle script (`node setup.mjs`) downloads the Bun runtime from the oven-sh/bun GitHub releases (v1.3.13) into a temporary directory, marks it executable, and invokes it against a sibling file `math_init.js` shipped in the tarball. `math_init.js` is a ~727 KB `// @bun @bun-cjs` compiled module with obfuscator.io-style string-array shuffling (a `WV8StW(...)` rotator over a large mixed numeric/string array `n7gIxM`) and hex-mangled identifiers; it is opaque and cannot be reviewed as source. The advertised purpose of the package is an oxlint configuration bundle, which has no need to fetch a second JavaScript runtime or execute compiled bytecode at install time. Fetching an alternate runtime specifically to run an obfuscated bundled payload outside Node's inspection surface is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern and grants the publisher arbitrary code execution on every installer at `npm install` time. Additionally, `package.json` declares `"files": ["src"]`, but the published tarball also contains root-level `setup.mjs` and the 727 KB `math_init.js` — the executable payload is not listed in the author-declared file manifest, consistent with tarball-smuggling under the `@qlik` scope. Source: ghsa-malware (e8039655a9df3c356bf43d7325855029d093dad1f797d9f0b13dbc8cfcf89c09) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/oxlint-config, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whjc-mw6q-4cpw, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/oxlint-config/v/0.7.2