MAL-2026-11805

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11805

MAL-2026-11805

Summary: Malicious code in @qlik/sprout-design-docs (npm)

Details: npm/@qlik/sprout-design-docs is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (bcd9104180dae4499c9900c978b651499257b1aeed933dfc73b4819855092808) The package advertises itself as design-system documentation for the Qlik sprout family and ships a Storybook/MDX scaffold, but package.json declares `"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"` which fires automatically on `npm install`. setup.mjs is obfuscator.io-style (identifiers `_0x488df8`, per-call scrambled string maps) and downloads the Bun runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/...zip`, then invokes `execFileSync(bunPath, [join(D, "math_init.js")], { stdio: "inherit", cwd: D })` against a 727KB obfuscated sibling bundle `math_init.js` (large rotating string-array, hex-numeric constants). Executing the payload under Bun rather than Node bypasses Node-only inspection. The documentation content and the install-time payload are unrelated; a docs package has no legitimate reason to fetch an alternate runtime and execute a large obfuscated bundle at install time. The shape is consistent with a maintainer-account compromise or hijack of the @qlik/sprout family. Source: ghsa-malware (c0e67ac25f88d46949420137921ea3c8a98a292cc802d77c2ae700e0a910e48f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/sprout-design-docs, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3hw-7p37-3vmh, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlik/sprout-design-docs/v/1.0.2