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MAL-2026-11817

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11817

MAL-2026-11817

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @servicetitan/anvil-icon (npm)

Details: npm/@servicetitan/anvil-icon is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (8dc1692b094a11a8579fab84d7377fe65631b140909ec27559c13ac8675aa9c8) The package declares itself as a Material Design icon SVG library but ships a preinstall script (setup.mjs, invoked via package.json scripts.preinstall) that downloads the Bun runtime binary from a GitHub release into a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and then uses it to run a sibling file math_init.js against the installer's host. math_init.js is a 727 KB blob whose header is `// @bun @bun-cjs`, obfuscated with a shuffled string-array plus alphabet-decoder pattern so its behavior cannot be resolved statically. setup.mjs itself is obfuscated with hex-style identifiers (`_0x488df8`, `_0x19328d.YCZJE(...)` wrappers around calls such as `execFileSync('ldd',...)`), matching the obfuscator.io style. Fetching a second language runtime and using it to execute an opaque bundled script at npm install time has no relationship to distributing icon SVGs; the alternate runtime bypasses Node-based inspection and the obfuscation of both the driver and the payload is consistent with deliberate evasion. Installing this package results in execution of attacker-staged, unreadable code on the installer's machine before any consumer code runs. Source: ghsa-malware (a8cc79f4cc10fbf1480118b148c8a0afd7a6e644fa6b888e09c96c233f36d182) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @servicetitan/anvil-icon

Purl: pkg:npm/%40servicetitan/anvil-icon

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

0.5.1

0.5.2

0.5.3

0.5.4

0.5.5

0.5.6

0.5.7