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MAL-2026-11829

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11829

MAL-2026-11829

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @servicetitan/anvil2-mcp (npm)

Details: npm/@servicetitan/anvil2-mcp is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (fb70f93c83a4f28dff4194a892ae94d71af782caa60fc8c0dd3dd44aed6f5ce7) The package declares a preinstall script (`node setup.mjs`) that, when a local `bun` binary is not present, downloads the Bun runtime zip from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/...zip`, extracts `bun`/`bun.exe` to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against `math_init.js` — a ~727KB single-line, heavily obfuscated JS bundle shipped in the tarball root. `math_init.js` uses string-array rotation, hex-suffixed identifier renaming, and large lookup-table character reconstruction; its filename does not correspond to any code in `dist/` (the advertised MCP server entry `dist/main.js` is ~2KB of ordinary JS and has no runtime-download requirement). `setup.mjs` itself is also obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style transforms with per-function string maps aliasing literals like `"bun"`, `"powershell"`, `"/etc/os-release"`, `"Alpine"`, `"--version"`, `"ldd"`), which is anti-analysis rather than minification for a setup script that would otherwise perform trivial tool detection. Executing an opaque payload through a freshly downloaded alternate runtime at preinstall time evades Node-based auditing and matches the alternate-runtime dropper pattern; the installer cannot see what code runs on their host. Source: ghsa-malware (7cffa8d4c1420a313c0af541522aa4f7b175cd3ca90f0603bed31ba5c45e5d3f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @servicetitan/anvil2-mcp

Purl: pkg:npm/%40servicetitan/anvil2-mcp

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

0.0.9

0.0.10

0.0.11

0.0.12

0.0.13

0.0.14

0.0.15