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MAL-2026-11845

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11845

MAL-2026-11845

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @servicetitan/cp-mfe-dev (npm)

Details: npm/@servicetitan/cp-mfe-dev is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (4393c7ff478e0c12ed3434a4682c2f1c598d4d11f62b5668a54dead8f9ed913b) The package declares a `preinstall` script that runs `setup.mjs`, which downloads the Bun runtime (bun-v1.3.13) from GitHub releases, unzips it into a temporary directory, marks it executable, and invokes it via `execFileSync(bunBinary, [math_init.js])` against a sibling file shipped in the tarball. `math_init.js` is a 728KB `// @bun @bun-cjs` blob whose contents are a shuffled multi-thousand-entry string/opcode array permuted at runtime by a rotation function (`WV8StW`) — heavy dictionary/opcode obfuscation that is only meaningful when executed by the downloaded Bun binary and is opaque to Node-based inspection. Handing an obfuscated blob to a second language runtime at install time is the alternate-runtime dropper pattern; the package's advertised purpose (a ServiceTitan MFE dev helper library) has no functional need for a second runtime. The package name `@servicetitan/cp-mfe-dev` mimics ServiceTitan's private npm scope and its peerDependencies list additional `@servicetitan/*` packages, making the artifact usable as a dependency-confusion lure targeting organizations with an internal ServiceTitan scope. The shipped `dist/` files are a thin SDK-shaped stub that serves as cover for the install-time dropper. Source: ghsa-malware (24492173684850c8fb0cdab1e5aaa1e383971d6b3e58ffb423863a4ab9471fc4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @servicetitan/cp-mfe-dev

Purl: pkg:npm/%40servicetitan/cp-mfe-dev

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

1.115.1

1.115.2

1.115.3

1.115.4

1.115.5

1.115.6

1.115.7