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MAL-2026-11857

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11857

MAL-2026-11857

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @servicetitan/dte-unlayer (npm)

Details: npm/@servicetitan/dte-unlayer is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (7b0cf369f0ac1925e3b63fac4f1e9433d95446b52f9a00adccea55a70b8312c0) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, extracts and chmods the Bun binary, and then uses it to execute a sibling file math_init.js from the tarball root. math_init.js is a ~727 KB heavily obfuscated blob using string-array rotation (function WV8StW) with a permuted-alphabet character decoder (hc1jfK9) and hex-mangled identifiers, unrelated to the package's advertised purpose as an Unlayer email-editor React wrapper. The library's dist/ and src/ trees implement the Unlayer wrapper normally and do not reference setup.mjs or math_init.js; the malicious surface is confined to the install lifecycle and never touches consumers who only require() the library. Using a downloaded alternate JavaScript runtime (Bun) to execute an obfuscated payload at npm install time is an evasion technique against Node-based install inspection, and running an opaque 727 KB blob with the installer's privileges yields arbitrary code execution on the developer/build machine. The @servicetitan scope suggests a hijack or malicious release published under an otherwise legitimate namespace. Source: ghsa-malware (6c15990a9fc4ccadb99d7e5aa7c03c9bb99fcc28244259193d482e2978a13c16) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @servicetitan/dte-unlayer

Purl: pkg:npm/%40servicetitan/dte-unlayer

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

0.150.1

0.150.2

0.150.3

0.150.4

0.150.5

0.150.6

0.150.7