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MAL-2026-11878

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11878

MAL-2026-11878

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @servicetitan/html-sketchapp (npm)

Details: npm/@servicetitan/html-sketchapp is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (78569ef919db1a63d5ac87f07c0fc46c027a58149071eef17d217b6c5094b0b8) The package's preinstall hook (`node setup.mjs`) downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against a bundled 727KB obfuscated JavaScript file `math_init.js` at the tarball root. Both `setup.mjs` and `math_init.js` are heavily obfuscated: `setup.mjs` uses `_0xNNNN` identifier indirection and dictionary-based string obfuscation to hide platform detection, download, and exec logic; `math_init.js` is a `@bun @bun-cjs` bundle with a shuffled string-array rotator (`WV8StW` shifting `MmgoCP`) and hex-mangled identifiers, with no readable control flow. Neither `math_init.js` nor `setup.mjs` is declared in `package.json`'s `files` array, though the manifest enumerates the package's real content (`asketch2sketch`, `html2asketch`, `build/...`) — the executed payload is present in the tarball but absent from the author's declared file manifest. The package's advertised purpose is HTML-to-Sketch conversion and has no functional need for a separate language runtime or a file named `math_init.js`. This matches the alternate-runtime dropper pattern: pulling in Bun to execute an opaque bundle smuggles code execution on install past Node-oriented inspection. Source: ghsa-malware (d970f3c09cd35c6f124b015d20b233e923d772b9ddd1f40be125fa2511d24f41) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @servicetitan/html-sketchapp

Purl: pkg:npm/%40servicetitan/html-sketchapp

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

4.2.8

4.2.9

4.2.10

4.2.11

4.2.12

4.2.13

4.2.14