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MAL-2026-11938

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11938

MAL-2026-11938

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-cypress (npm)

Details: npm/@servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-cypress is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (0b1e49eb3f83121b57ebcc1d685c48a88653517ebee9f9a48bb1a03d9faacc34) @servicetitan/[email protected] declares a preinstall script (`node setup.mjs`) that downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases (bun-v1.3.13), chmod 0755's the extracted binary, and uses execFileSync to run the bundled sibling `math_init.js` under Bun. Both setup.mjs and math_init.js are heavily obfuscated: setup.mjs uses hex-named identifiers (`_0x...`) with control-flow flattening, and math_init.js is a ~727KB single-line bundle with string-array rotation (`WV8StW` array-shuffle), a mixed numeric/string constant table (`n7gIxM`), and a decoder function (`hc1jfK9`) with a shuffled charset alphabet — typical obfuscator.io output. The package's advertised surface is trivial Cypress selector constants (`main:./dist/index.js` re-exports from `./utils/chat-ui-selectors`), which does not require a second-language runtime or a 727KB obfuscated payload at install time. Using an alternate downloaded runtime to execute an obfuscated bundle from a lifecycle hook evades scanners that inspect only Node-resolved code. Package name and CHANGELOG references to `github.com/servicetitan/titan-chatbot-client` are consistent with impersonation of a ServiceTitan internal package targeting that organization's consumers. Source: ghsa-malware (4850493957883c05f49c15a80a523e23d212f9184b3acd0bc4ca5aa125be1d3c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-cypress

Purl: pkg:npm/%40servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-cypress

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

2.1.3

2.1.4

2.1.5

2.1.6

2.1.7

2.1.8

2.1.9