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MAL-2026-11939

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11939

MAL-2026-11939

Published: 4 Aug 2026Last Modified: 5 Aug 2026Aliases:

Summary: Malicious code in @servicetitan/titan-chatbot-api (npm)

Details: npm/@servicetitan/titan-chatbot-api is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (a7ebf6d345e953995ad537d87b12b741fd9a6167b5a4a20d5ae3c0e736b85d1a) The published tarball contains two files not present in the src/ tree: setup.mjs and math_init.js. package.json declares "preinstall": "node setup.mjs", so on every npm install the dropper runs automatically. setup.mjs (itself obfuscated with _0xNNNN identifiers) downloads a Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases (version 1.3.13), extracts the bun binary to a temp directory, chmod +x's it, and invokes it against the sibling file math_init.js in the package directory. math_init.js is a 727KB obfuscated blob consisting of a rotated string array plus an alphabet-substitution decoder (`hc1jfK9`) with hex-named globals; no source form exists in src/. Executing the payload with an alien runtime (Bun rather than Node) evades Node-based static analysis and instrumentation. The package's declared purpose is a ServiceTitan chatbot API client, which has no legitimate need for a second language runtime or an opaque native payload at install time. Combined static and dynamic analysis of native-client.js also shows POST calls and a `ping` primitive at line 1243. The presence-in-tarball / absence-in-source pattern for both dropper files is consistent with a compromised publish injecting attack files outside the normal build pipeline. Source: ghsa-malware (25410adfd400df441f76dc298a82a281dac3ac6bf24964ed37ec9d635267a032) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected packages

Package

Name: @servicetitan/titan-chatbot-api

Purl: pkg:npm/%40servicetitan/titan-chatbot-api

Affected ranges

Type: N/A

Events:

Introduced- None

Fixed -None

Affected versions

9.0.1

9.0.2

9.0.3

9.0.4

9.0.5

9.0.6

9.0.7