MAL-2026-11954

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-11954

MAL-2026-11954

Summary: Malicious code in @umacloud/cli-darwin-x64 (npm)

Details: npm/@umacloud/cli-darwin-x64 is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (a82da757a3dfc9d917e7824f3cf170cd12ded006454579d5b3371d52a03cf24d) package.json declares `preinstall: node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs fetches the Bun runtime (v1.3.13) as a zip from the oven-sh/bun GitHub releases, extracts it to a tmpdir, chmods the binary executable, and invokes it against `math_init.js` — a 727KB `@bun @bun-cjs`-compiled JS file shipped at the tarball root that carries a string-array-shuffle obfuscator (WV8StW rotation, `_0x`-style identifiers, a ~1000-entry constant array). package.json's `files` whitelist declares only `bin/`, so both `setup.mjs` and `math_init.js` are shipped outside the declared manifest. The result is that `npm install` automatically fetches an alternate language runtime and uses it to execute a large opaque bundle whose behavior is deliberately unreadable to Node-based reviewers, without user consent. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape: the second runtime is introduced specifically to run sibling code (`math_init.js`) that a Node-focused review pipeline will not analyze, and the payload is heavily obfuscated and undeclared in the publish manifest. Source: ghsa-malware (272ca53797c9ecdafbe5e3de02d3dca5dd5c9ad3046d7455aa9b670d2d28a013) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@umacloud/cli-darwin-x64, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qqc5-qqrh-3hx8, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@umacloud/cli-darwin-x64/v/1.0.74