MAL-2026-11960

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MAL-2026-11960

Summary: Malicious code in @umacloud/knowledge (npm)

Details: npm/@umacloud/knowledge is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. Source: amazon-inspector (0676e591b1646c5f15160cdd8bb3e0b5ff88e5194e1d1dec5b258816f51d1da7) @umacloud/knowledge advertises itself as a markdown knowledge corpus, and its package.json `files` field allow-lists only `**/*.md`. The tarball nonetheless ships two undeclared root-level JavaScript blobs, setup.mjs and math_init.js, and declares a `preinstall` hook that runs setup.mjs. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (`_0x488df8`, `_0x52943e` style identifiers with decoy objects) and downloads the Bun runtime (bun-v1.3.13 zip) from GitHub releases into a temp directory, extracts it, chmods the binary to 0755, and invokes it via execFileSync against the bundled math_init.js. math_init.js is a heavily obfuscated single-line 727KB bundle beginning with `// @bun @bun-cjs` and using string-array rotation packing (`function WV8StW(...){for(...)MmgoCP.push(MmgoCP.shift());return MmgoCP}`) that requires the Bun runtime to execute, evading Node-based scanners. The Bun runtime and the executed payload are unrelated to the package's stated markdown-corpus purpose, and both the loader and the payload are obfuscated to hide their behavior. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: an unrelated package pulls a non-default runtime at preinstall solely to execute a bundled opaque payload. Source: ghsa-malware (317ca95eed4b7f5c327dbaa41c176e8cf2f9ea8e18afed15db092ded48983b5d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/keyv-and-friends-compromised-in-npm-supply-chain-attack, https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@umacloud/knowledge, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vpvg-254v-wp7h, https://www.npmjs.com/package/@umacloud/knowledge/v/1.0.74