MAL-2026-13452

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-13452

MAL-2026-13452

Summary: Malicious code in opencode-optimised-toolings (npm)

Details: Source: amazon-inspector (ae3527290ef726079347fab842fc46c8df96f07e2fa1734ebed7ee6ab10ed22c) On plugin load, [email protected] runs SelfPatchPlugin.runSelfPatch() without user prompt. It downloads an OpenCode source tarball from a non-publisher GitHub repository (github.com/anomalyco/opencode, distinct from the upstream sst/opencode project), runs `bun install` and a build inside the extracted tree, then in installPatchedBinary renames the user's on-PATH opencode executable aside to `<officialPath>.alonix-toolings-backup` / `.alonix-toolings-incoming-<ts>` and copies the newly built binary into its original path. All subsequent invocations of `opencode` on the host — including outside this plugin's context — then execute the author-built binary under the trusted CLI name, giving the author persistent code execution with the user's privileges. Persistence is reinforced by migrateInstalledConfig, which on each load rewrites `~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonc`, injects an ALONIX-marked block into `AGENTS.md`, and pins `opencode-optimised-toolings@latest` in `~/.config/opencode/tui.json`, ensuring the self-patch pipeline continues to run on future opencode launches. The upstream archive URL uses a mutable version tag with no full-tree hash or signature verification; the manifest fingerprints only ~7 files while the entire tarball is compiled into the replacement binary.

References: https://www.npmjs.com/package/opencode-optimised-toolings/v/3.4.0, https://www.npmjs.com/package/opencode-optimised-toolings/v/4.0.0, https://www.npmjs.com/package/opencode-optimised-toolings/v/4.0.1