MAL-2026-2037

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-2037

MAL-2026-2037

Summary: Malicious code in @emilgroup/auth-sdk-node (npm)

Details: Source: amazon-inspector (eb97d9a2d10d2c28d1f0bef4d81cc0d9c2649e94df11e9620f442d7d503d89c3) Analysis of @emilgroup/[email protected] produced no a static rule matches and no traced install-time or import-time behaviors indicating credential theft, exfiltration, remote code execution, silent-relay, backdoor, or dependency-chain dropper patterns. No attacker-controlled network destinations, no lifecycle hooks fetching external code, and no reads of installer secret paths were observed. Source: ghsa-malware (9e1e171ea3809a2a4defc33338d7c733b582525ff73609fcea0ea374d8c22210) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. Source: google-open-source-security (fe2626034ff9db4050961980269d01868886c3b537585d5e9bf6fb31eba94fd5) This package was compromised by the CanisterWorm campaign by the TeamPCP threat actor. The malicious payload establishes persistence as user systemd service and places a backdoor on the infected host. The malware will also harvest npm credentials and can autonomously spread.

References: https://socket.dev/blog/canisterworm-npm-publisher-compromise-deploys-backdoor-across-29-packages, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8328-7r2v-2fq6, https://research.jfrog.com/post/canister-worm/, https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/canisterworm