MAL-2026-5354

Dashboard / Malicious Package / MAL-2026-5354

MAL-2026-5354

Summary: Malicious code in defi-tools-39 (npm)

Details: Crypto/SSH/wallet stealer, blockchain-helper-0 campaign sibling (c960+), byte-identical to swap-sdk-87. postinstall auto-execs, src/index.js harvests ~/.ssh keys + Sol/Eth/BTC/Tron/Sui/Aptos wallets + .env + seeds, self-labels "CRYPTO STEALER", exfils to SAME Telegram bot 8227918239 chat 6433587894 (not rotated). Source: amazon-inspector (d56fe423f0b7b6fd3188d49ea50e2ebb2e7f6e6c76c5c4682062395b7fe11a94) On `npm install`, the postinstall hook requires src/index.js, which enumerates a hardcoded list of crypto wallet files, SSH private keys, and environment/mnemonic files in the user's home and current working directory (including `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.config/solana/id.json`, `.env`, and seed/mnemonic files for Solana, Ethereum, Bitcoin, Tron, Sui, and Aptos). The collected file contents are POSTed to `api.telegram.org` using a hardcoded bot token (`8227918239:AAGE...`) and chat ID (`6433587894`). The payload self-identifies as `<b>CRYPTO STEALER</b>` in the Telegram message body. Execution is gated by an `isTestEnvironment()` check at src/index.js:11-26 that suppresses the payload in CI, GitHub Actions, Jenkins, Docker, and sandbox-shaped hostnames/usernames — analysis-evasion to keep the stealer dormant during scanning and active on developer workstations. The package ships no legitimate functionality; the generic name `defi-tools-39` with a bland 'Cryptocurrency wallet management toolkit' description targets developers searching for DeFi/wallet tooling — the cohort most likely to have on-disk wallet keypairs.

References: https://app.safedep.io/community/malysis/01KTN8W8PEWZ927N45SGX97T34, https://www.npmjs.com/package/defi-tools-39/v/4.26.29