Vulnerabilities
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Vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-54788
dd-trace-rs: Unbounded W3C tracestate parsing may lead to DoS
CVE-2026-44965
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device. This requires: A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen. An active Datadog session cached locally. Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.
CVE-2026-44964
Exported Activity Without Permission Guard Enables Forged On‑Call Acknowledgements in Datadog Android App
CVE-2026-47364
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, the app tags Crashlytics data with the user's Datadog UUID, with no user-facing opt-out. Impact: The Datadog user UUID and crash data are visible within Firebase Crashlytics. This UUID is not identifying outside Datadog's own systems.
CVE-2026-47363
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, the exported launcher activity AppActivity accepts an attacker-supplied session (including OAuth tokens) from Intent extras with no permission guard, and signs the app into that session without validating it against the backend. This requires a malicious application co-installed on a device with the Datadog app installed, and an OAuth token the attacker is willing to load into the victim's app. Impact: A co-installed application can switch the victim's Datadog app to a session the attacker controls. This is an account-confusion issue; it does not by itself expose the victim's existing session or data.
