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    Vulnerabilities

    CVE-2026-31224

    The snorkel library thru v0.10.0 contains an insecure deserialization vulnerability (CWE-502) in the MultitaskClassifier.load() method of the MultitaskClassifier class. The method loads model weight files using torch.load() without enabling the security-restrictive weights_only=True parameter. This default behavior allows the deserialization of arbitrary Python objects via the Pickle module. A remote attacker can exploit this by providing a maliciously crafted model file, leading to arbitrary code execution on the victim's system when the file is loaded via the vulnerable method.

    Last Modified: May 17, 2026
    Published: May 12, 2026

    CVE-2026-31223

    The snorkel library thru v0.10.0 contains a critical insecure deserialization vulnerability (CWE-502) in the BaseLabeler.load() method of the BaseLabeler class. The method loads serialized labeler models using the unsafe pickle.load() function on user-supplied file paths without any validation or security controls. Python's pickle module is inherently dangerous for deserializing untrusted data, as it can execute arbitrary code during the deserialization process. A remote attacker can exploit this by providing a maliciously crafted pickle file, leading to arbitrary code execution on the victim's system when the file is loaded via the vulnerable method.

    Last Modified: May 17, 2026
    Published: May 12, 2026

    CVE-2026-31222

    The snorkel library thru v0.10.0 contains an insecure deserialization vulnerability (CWE-502) in the Trainer.load() method of the Trainer class. The method loads model checkpoint files using torch.load() without enabling the security-restrictive weights_only=True parameter. This default behavior allows the deserialization of arbitrary Python objects via the Pickle module. A remote attacker can exploit this by providing a maliciously crafted model file, leading to arbitrary code execution on the victim's system when the file is loaded via the vulnerable method.

    Last Modified: May 17, 2026
    Published: May 12, 2026
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