EEF-CVE-2026-66294

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    EEF-CVE-2026-66294

    Published: 6 Nov 2026Last Modified: 6 Nov 2026

    Summary: XML injection in Saxy via unescaped CDATA section terminator

    Details: ## Summary XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. `Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1` serializes a `{:cdata, characters}` node by wrapping the supplied characters between `<![CDATA[` and `]]>` and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder's character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters `<`, `>`, `&`, `"`, and `'`, but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a `]]>` substring is to split the section and rejoin it as `]]]]><![CDATA[>`. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring. An application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with `Saxy.XML.cdata/1` and serializing it with `Saxy.encode!/2` or `Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2`, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the `]]>` is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. ## Workarounds Render untrusted text as ordinary character data instead of CDATA, by passing a plain string or `Saxy.XML.characters/1` to the element builder. That encoder path escapes the XML metacharacters and preserves the same text content. If a CDATA section is required, split the terminator in application code before building the node: replace every occurrence of `]]>` in the untrusted text with `]]]]><![CDATA[>` and pass the result to `Saxy.XML.cdata/1`. Once the encoder wraps that payload, the output is the standard split encoding.

    Affected packages

    Package

    Name: saxy

    Purl: pkg:hex/saxy

    Affected ranges

    Type: SEMVER

    Events:

    Introduced- 0.7.0
    Fixed -1.7.0

    Affected versions

    0.10.0

    Common Vulnerability Scoring System

    Attack Vector
    Network
    Adjacent
    Local
    Physical
    Privileges Required
    None
    Low
    High
    User Interaction
    None
    Required
    Scope
    Unchanged
    Changed
    Confidentiality
    None
    Low
    High
    Integrity
    None
    Low
    High
    Availability
    None
    Low
    High
    EEF-CVE-2026-66294 | CVE-DB