GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2

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    GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2

    Published: 25 May 2021Last Modified: 10 Sept 2026

    Summary: Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects in oauth2-proxy

    Details: ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect. For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for `.example.com`, the intention is that subdomains of `example.com` are allowed. Instead, `example.com` and `badexample.com` could also match. ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain. # Original Issue Posted by @semoac: Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain. ## Expected Behavior If whitelist domain is set to `.example.com` , then `hack.alienexample.com` should be rejected as a valid redirect. ## Current Behavior The code is removing the `dot` from `.example.com` and only checking if the redirect string end with `example.com` ## Possible Solution Here https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/c377466411f2aee180a732187edb638f2f7e57fb/oauthproxy.go#L661 Include the dot when checking the string: ``` strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, "." + domainHostname) ``` ## Steps to Reproduce (for bugs) ``` package main import ( "fmt" "strings" ) func validOptionalPort(port string) bool { if port == "" || port == ":*" { return true } if port[0] != ':' { return false } for _, b := range port[1:] { if b < '0' || b > '9' { return false } } return true } func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) { host = hostport colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':') if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) { host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:] } if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") { host = host[1 : len(host)-1] } return } func main() { domain := ".example.com" domainHostname, _ := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, ".")) redirectHostname := "https://hack.alienexample.com" if (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) { fmt.Println("This should not have happen.")} } ``` Users of `github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy` are advised to update to `github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7`

    Affected packages

    Package

    Name: github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

    Purl: pkg:golang/github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

    Affected ranges

    Type: SEMVER

    Events:

    Introduced- 0
    Fixed -7.0.0

    Affected versions

    Common Vulnerability Scoring System

    Attack Vector
    Network
    Adjacent
    Local
    Physical
    Privileges Required
    None
    Low
    High
    User Interaction
    None
    Required
    Scope
    Unchanged
    Changed
    Confidentiality
    None
    Low
    High
    Integrity
    None
    Low
    High
    Availability
    None
    Low
    High
    GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2 | CVE-DB