GHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc

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GHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc

Summary: Devise has a confirmable "change email" race condition permits user to confirm email they have no access to

Details: ### Impact A race condition in Devise's Confirmable module allows an attacker to confirm an email address they do not own. This affects any Devise application using the `reconfirmable` option (the default when using Confirmable with email changes). By sending two concurrent email change requests, an attacker can desynchronize the `confirmation_token` and `unconfirmed_email` fields. The confirmation token is sent to an email the attacker controls, but the `unconfirmed_email` in the database points to a victim's email address. When the attacker uses the token, the victim's email is confirmed on the attacker's account. ### Patches This is patched in Devise **v5.0.3**. Users should upgrade as soon as possible. ### Workarounds Applications can override this specific method from Devise models to force `unconfirmed_email` to be persisted when unchanged: (assuming your model is `User`) ```ruby class User < ApplicationRecord protected def postpone_email_change_until_confirmation_and_regenerate_confirmation_token unconfirmed_email_will_change! super end end ``` Note: Mongoid does not seem to respect that `will_change!` should force the attribute to be persisted, even if it did not really change, so you might have to implement a workaround similar to Devise by setting `changed_attributes["unconfirmed_email"] = nil` as well.

References: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/security/advisories/GHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32700, https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/issues/5783, https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/pull/5784, https://github.com/heartcombo/devise, https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/devise/CVE-2026-32700.yml, https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/devise/GHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc.yml