GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3
Dashboard / Vulnerabilities / GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3
Summary: Netty has Unbounded Direct Memory Consumption in its RedisDecoder
Details: ### Summary An attacker can cause DoS by sending crafted Redis payloads across multiple connections without `\r\n`. This exhausts the server's direct memory pool (OutOfDirectMemoryError), preventing legitimate connections from being processed. ### Details io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisDecoder decodes the length of bulk strings and array headers using the `decodeLength` method. This method reads bytes from the network until it encounters a `\n` character. However, it does not enforce any maximum length check while buffering the bytes if the `\n` character is not found. An attacker can exploit this by sending a continuous stream of digits (e.g., `$1111...`) without ever sending a `\n`. To cause a true Denial of Service, an attacker must open multiple concurrent connections and distribute the unbounded payloads among them. According to the RESP specification (https://redis.io/docs/latest/develop/reference/protocol-spec/), all parts of the protocol are strictly terminated with `\r\n`. Furthermore, the length prefix itself is an integer representation that must fit within standard numeric limits (e.g., a 64-bit signed integer). Therefore, a stream of digits exceeding these bounds without `\r\n` is a protocol violation and should be rejected immediately rather than buffered indefinitely. ### Impact Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty's RedisDecoder to handle untrusted Redis traffic is vulnerable.
References: https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44890, https://github.com/netty/netty, https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final, https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final
Affected packages
Package
Name: io.netty:netty-codec-redis
Purl: pkg:maven/io.netty/netty-codec-redis
Affected ranges
Type: ECOSYSTEM
Events:
