GHSA-cvj7-5f3c-9vg9

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GHSA-cvj7-5f3c-9vg9

Summary: AttesterSlashing number overflow

Details: ### Impact Possible consensus split given maliciously-crafted `AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` being included on-chain. Since we represent `uint64` values as native javascript `number`s, there is an issue when those variables with large (greater than 2^53) `uint64` values are included on chain. In those cases, Lodestar may view _valid_ `AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` as _invalid_, due to rounding errors in large `number` values. This causes a consensus split, where Lodestar nodes are forked away from the main network. Similarly Lodestar may consider _invalid_ `ProposerSlashing` as _valid_, thus including in proposed blocks that will be considered invalid by the network. ### Patches https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/pull/3977 ### Workarounds Use `BigInt` to represent `Slot` and `Epoch` values in `AttesterSlashing` and `ProposerSlashing` objects. `BigInt` is too slow to be used in all `Slot` and `Epoch` cases, so we will carefully use `BigInt` just where necessary for consensus.

References: https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/security/advisories/GHSA-cvj7-5f3c-9vg9, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29219, https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/pull/3977, https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar, https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/releases/tag/v0.36.0