GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm

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GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm

Summary: matrix-android-sdk2 vulnerable to Olm/Megolm protocol confusion

Details: ### Impact An attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. ### Patches matrix-android-sdk2 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added: - Cleartext `m.room_key`, `m.forwarded_room_key` and `m.secret.send` to_device messages are discarded. - Secrets received from untrusted devices are discarded. - Key backups are only usable if they have a valid signature from a trusted device (no more local trust, or trust-on-decrypt). - The origin of a to-device message should only be determined by observing the Olm session which managed to decrypt the message, and not by using claimed sender_key, user_id, or any other fields controllable by the homeserver. ### Workarounds As this attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, if you trust your home server no particular workaround is needed. Notice that the backup spoofing attack is a particularly sophisticated targeted attack. We are not aware of this attack being used in the wild, though specifying a false positive-free way of noticing malicious key backups key is challenging. As an abundance of caution, to avoid malicious backup attacks, you should not verify your new logins using emoji/QR verifications methods until patched. Prefer using verify with passphrase. ### References Blog post: https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, e-mail us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]).

References: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39248, https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e, https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2, https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1, https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients