GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr

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GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr

Summary: reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

Details: ## Summary The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms. An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks. ## Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system: 1. Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API \<= current finding 2. Bluetooth Authentication Bypass 3. Bluetooth Directory Traversal ## Description The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “***src/daemon/app/routers/media.py***” file at the “upload\_sound” method: ```py @router.post("/sounds/upload") async def upload_sound( file: UploadFile = File(...), ) -> dict[str, str]: """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory. The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``. If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten. Returns: JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon. """ if not file.filename: raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required") # Reject path traversal filename = Path(file.filename).name if not filename or filename in (".", ".."): raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename") os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True) dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename) content = await file.read() with open(dest, "wb") as f: f.write(content) return {"status": "ok", "path": dest} ``` This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms: 1. No authentication mechanism. 2. No file extension validation. 3. No file content/size validation. Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow\_origins=\[“\*”\] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to. # PoC 1. Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment): ```shell .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media ``` 2. After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file: ```shell curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \ -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav" ``` 3. Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it: ```shell curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \ -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh" ``` 4. Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk. # Impact Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise. ## Fix suggestion Perform the following check on the API endpoint: 1. Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach). 2. Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type). 3. Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint. ## Credit The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

References: https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/security/advisories/GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr, https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/commit/984c7723b3ec5da63f4e0a2bcf9f120ceb563e04, https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini