GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475

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GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475

Summary: OpenTelemetry-Go: multi-value `baggage` header extraction causes excessive allocations (remote dos amplification)

Details: multi-value `baggage:` header extraction parses each header field-value independently and aggregates members across values. this allows an attacker to amplify cpu and allocations by sending many `baggage:` header lines, even when each individual value is within the 8192-byte per-value parse limit. ## severity HIGH (availability / remote request amplification) ## relevant links - repository: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go - pinned callsite: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a/propagation/baggage.go#L58 ## vulnerability details **pins:** open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go@1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a **as-of:** 2026-02-04 **policy:** direct (no program scope provided) **callsite:** propagation/baggage.go:58 (`extractMultiBaggage`) **attacker control:** inbound HTTP request headers (many `baggage` field-values) → `propagation.HeaderCarrier.Values("baggage")` → repeated `baggage.Parse` + member aggregation ### root cause `extractMultiBaggage` iterates over all `baggage` header field-values and parses each one independently, then appends members into a shared slice. the 8192-byte parsing cap applies per header value, but the multi-value path repeats that work once per header line (bounded only by the server/proxy header byte limit). ### impact in a default `net/http` configuration (max header bytes 1mb), a single request with many `baggage:` header field-values can cause large per-request allocations and increased latency. example from the attached PoC harness (darwin/arm64; 80 values; 40 requests): - canonical: `per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458` and `p95_ms=7` - control: `per_req_alloc_bytes=133429` and `p95_ms=0` ## proof of concept canonical: ```bash mkdir -p poc unzip poc.zip -d poc cd poc make test ``` output (excerpt): ``` [CALLSITE_HIT]: propagation/baggage.go:58 extractMultiBaggage [PROOF_MARKER]: baggage_multi_value_amplification p95_ms=7 per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458 per_req_allocs=16165 ``` control: ```bash cd poc make control ``` control output (excerpt): ``` [NC_MARKER]: baggage_single_value_baseline p95_ms=0 per_req_alloc_bytes=133429 per_req_allocs=480 ``` **expected:** multiple `baggage` header field-values should be semantically equivalent to a single comma-joined `baggage` value and should not multiply parsing/alloc work within the effective header byte budget. **actual:** multiple `baggage` header field-values trigger repeated parsing and member aggregation, causing high per-request allocations and increased latency even when each individual value is within 8192 bytes. ## fix recommendation avoid repeated parsing across multi-values by enforcing a global budget and/or normalizing multi-values into a single value before parsing. one mitigation approach is to treat multi-values as a single comma-joined string and cap total parsed bytes (for example 8192 bytes total). **fix accepted when:** under the default PoC harness settings, canonical stays within 2x of control for `per_req_alloc_bytes` and `per_req_allocs`, and `p95_ms` stays below 2ms. [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079945/poc.zip) [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079946/PR_DESCRIPTION.md)

References: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29181, https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/7880, https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/aa1894e09e3fe66860c7885cb40f98901b35277f, https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go, https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/v1.41.0