GHSA-p95v-992w-h6c3

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GHSA-p95v-992w-h6c3

Summary: TOON: Prototype pollution when decoding untrusted TOON input

Details: ### Summary Decoding attacker-controlled TOON containing a `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` key wrote through the object's prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting `Object.prototype` for the whole runtime. The `expandPaths: 'safe'` path (dotted keys such as `a.__proto__.x`) was the strongest vector; plain nested objects, tabular rows, and quoted keys were all affected. The encoder had a matching defect: it silently dropped own `__proto__` properties and could fire an inherited setter while normalizing. ### Impact Any service that decodes untrusted TOON is affected. Prototype pollution can escalate to denial of service or, with a suitable downstream gadget, remote code execution. ### Patches Upgrade to `@toon-format/[email protected]`. Decoders now materialize `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` as ordinary own data properties, matching `JSON.parse` semantics; the encoder preserves the same keys without invoking inherited accessors. ### Workarounds None. Upgrade is the only fix. Callers who cannot upgrade should reject input whose keys include `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` before decoding. ### Port maintainers The same bug shape can exist in any implementation that assigns decoded keys with `obj[key] = value`. Rust, Swift, Java, Python, and C# ports should audit their object-construction and path-expansion paths for the three prototype keys.

References: https://github.com/toon-format/toon/security/advisories/GHSA-p95v-992w-h6c3, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82404, https://github.com/toon-format/toon/pull/316, https://github.com/toon-format/toon/commit/94a2b7560b2b5ed903a4d466a3bce8b13daa2660, https://github.com/toon-format/toon, https://github.com/toon-format/toon/releases/tag/v2.3.1