GHSA-qhmp-q7xh-99rh

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GHSA-qhmp-q7xh-99rh

Summary: CoreDNS has TSIG authentication bypass on DoT, DoH, DoH3, DoQ, and gRPC

Details: ### Summary CoreDNS' tsig plugin can be bypassed on non-plain-DNS transports because it trusts the transport writer's TsigStatus() instead of performing verification itself. In the attached PoC, plain DNS/TCP correctly rejects an invalid TSIG (NOTAUTH), while the same invalid-TSIG request is accepted over DoT (tls://) and DoH (https://), allowing a client without the shared secret to satisfy require all. The same bug class affects DoH3, DoQ, and gRPC. ### Details The tsig plugin decides whether an incoming TSIG was valid by consulting w.TsigStatus(): tsigStatus := w.TsigStatus(); if tsigStatus != nil { ... NOTAUTH ... } (plugin/tsig/tsig.go) Two affected transports are shown directly in the PoC: - DoH: DoHWriter.TsigStatus() always returns nil (core/dnsserver/https.go), and the HTTP server passes unpacked DNS messages directly into the plugin chain. - DoT: the TLS server builds a dns.Server without setting TsigSecret (core/dnsserver/server_tls.go), unlike plain DNS/TCP/UDP which sets TsigSecret: s.tsigSecret (core/dnsserver/server.go). The same transport-family bug pattern also appears on other transports: - DoH3 reuses the DoH writer path (core/dnsserver/server_https3.go -> core/dnsserver/https.go), so it inherits the same TsigStatus() == nil behavior. - DoQ uses DoQWriter.TsigStatus() error { return nil } (core/dnsserver/quic.go). - gRPC uses gRPCresponse.TsigStatus() error { return nil } (core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go). The attached PoC was kept deliberately small (baseline TCP+DoT+DoH only) for convenience. ### PoC 1. Adjust COREDNS_BIN in the PoC to point at right path (see the top-level const definitions for tunables as well) 2. Run python3 ./tsig-repro.py 3. Expected output: *** Start CoreDNS *** Corefile: /tmp/vh-f001-tsig-doh-dot-bypass/Corefile Log: /tmp/vh-f001-tsig-doh-dot-bypass/coredns.log *** Baseline (plain TCP) *** no_tsig rcode=5 (expected REFUSED=5) invalid_tsig rcode=9 (expected NOTAUTH=9) *** Candidate (DoT) *** no_tsig rcode=5 (expected REFUSED=5) invalid_tsig rcode=0 ancount=1 (expected NOERROR=0 and ancount>0) *** Candidate (DoH) *** no_tsig http=200 rcode=5 (expected REFUSED=5) invalid_tsig http=200 rcode=0 ancount=1 (expected NOERROR=0 and ancount>0) *** OK *** TSIG bypass reproduced: plain TCP rejects invalid TSIG, while DoT and DoH accept it. Results: /tmp/vh-f001-tsig-doh-dot-bypass/results.json ### Impact Unauthenticated remote clients can bypass TSIG-based authentication/authorization on first-class encrypted transports, enabling access to whatever the deployment intended to restrict behind tsig { require all } (e.g., zone data/privileged queries, etc.).

References: https://github.com/coredns/coredns/security/advisories/GHSA-qhmp-q7xh-99rh, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33190, https://github.com/coredns/coredns, https://github.com/coredns/coredns/releases/tag/v1.14.3