GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv

Dashboard / Vulnerabilities / GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv

GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv

Summary: The pattern '/\domain.com' is not disallowed when redirecting, allowing for open redirect

Details: ### Impact An open redirect vulnerability has been found in `oauth2_proxy`. Anyone who uses `oauth2_proxy` may potentially be impacted. For a context [detectify] have an in depth blog post about the potential impact of an open redirect. Particularly see the OAuth section. **tl;dr**: People's authentication tokens could be silently harvested by an attacker. e.g: `facebook.com/oauth.php?clientid=123&state=abc&redirect_url=https://yourdomain.com/red.php?url%3dhttps://attacker.com/` ### Patches @sauyon found the issue, and has submitted a patch. ``` diff --git a/oauthproxy.go b/oauthproxy.go index 72ab580..f420df6 100644 --- a/oauthproxy.go +++ b/oauthproxy.go @@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ func (p *OAuthProxy) GetRedirect(req *http.Request) (redirect string, err error) // IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool { switch { - case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//"): + case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/\\"): return true case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"): redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect) ``` This patch will be applied to the next release, which is scheduled for when this is publicly disclosed. ### Workarounds At this stage there is no work around.

References: https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5233, https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2_proxy/commit/a316f8a06f3c0ca2b5fc5fa18a91781b313607b2, https://blog.detectify.com/2019/05/16/the-real-impact-of-an-open-redirect, https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2_proxy/releases/tag/v5.0.0