GHSA-vj7q-gjh5-988w

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GHSA-vj7q-gjh5-988w

Summary: MCP Python SDK: WebSocket server transport does not support Host/Origin validation

Details: ### Summary In affected versions, the deprecated WebSocket server transport (`mcp.server.websocket.websocket_server`) accepted the WebSocket handshake without applying any `Host` or `Origin` header validation. The `TransportSecuritySettings` mechanism that the SSE and Streamable HTTP transports use for this purpose was not wired into the WebSocket transport, so there was no SDK-level way to restrict which origins could connect. ### Am I affected? Only if a developer's application server exposes `mcp.server.websocket.websocket_server`. This transport has never been part of the MCP specification, is marked deprecated, and is not reachable through `FastMCP` — a developer must have wired it into an ASGI application themselves. Servers using stdio, SSE, or Streamable HTTP are not affected by this advisory. ### Details `websocket_server()` constructed a Starlette `WebSocket` and called `accept(subprotocol="mcp")` immediately, with no inspection of the connection's headers. By contrast, `SseServerTransport` and `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` accept an optional `security_settings: TransportSecuritySettings` and run `TransportSecurityMiddleware.validate_request()` against the incoming `Host` and `Origin` headers before establishing a session. Because browsers attach an `Origin` header to cross-origin WebSocket upgrade requests but do not enforce a same-origin policy on the response, a web page served from any origin could open a WebSocket to a reachable MCP server on this transport, complete the `initialize` handshake, and issue JSON-RPC requests on the resulting session. ### Impact A user who runs an MCP server on this transport bound to localhost or a LAN address, without a separate authentication or origin gate in front of it, and visits a malicious web page, can have that page enumerate and invoke the server's tools and read its resources. The consequences depend entirely on what the server exposes. The transport itself requires no token or prior session. Some browsers prompt before allowing a public page to open a connection to a local-network address, which adds a user-interaction step but is not a substitute for server-side validation. ### Mitigation Upgrade to version 1.28.1 or later, in which `websocket_server()` accepts the same optional `security_settings: TransportSecuritySettings` argument as the other HTTP-based transports and validates the `Host` and `Origin` headers before accepting the handshake; a request that fails validation is rejected with HTTP 403 and `ValueError("Request validation failed")` is raised to the caller. As with the other transports the parameter defaults to `None`, which leaves validation disabled, so upgrading alone does not change behaviour: pass a `TransportSecuritySettings` with `enable_dns_rebinding_protection=True` and appropriate `allowed_hosts` / `allowed_origins` to receive the protection. The recommended path remains to migrate off this deprecated transport to Streamable HTTP, where `FastMCP` enables this protection automatically for localhost binds. The WebSocket transport has been removed entirely in v2.

References: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-vj7q-gjh5-988w, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59950, https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/pull/2992, https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/commit/777b8d06710c140e3606b0d4598e2aa48546c266, https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk, https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/releases/tag/v1.28.1