GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279

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GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279

Summary: Auth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them

Details: ## Summary Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks (`state`, `nonce`, and the PKCE verifier) in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider, because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity (provider id, issuer, client id, or redirect URI). In a multi-provider app that allows account linking while logged in, this provider-confusion / mix-up condition can let an attacker link their account at a second provider to a victim's user. ## Am I affected? You may be affected if **all** of the following hold: - You use `next-auth` `<= 4.24.14` or `>= 5.0.0-beta.1, <= 5.0.0-beta.31`, or `@auth/core` `<= 0.41.2`. - You configure multiple OAuth/OIDC providers. - You allow users to link additional providers while logged in. - At least one configured provider's authorization request is observable by an attacker, and at least one target provider's callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier (i.e. it relies only on `state` or only on `nonce`). You are **not** affected if you use a single OAuth provider, do not allow logged-in account linking, or all providers enforce PKCE. ## Impact - Account-linking confusion: an attacker can get their account at a target provider linked to the victim's Auth.js user, granting the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account through that linked provider. - Exploitation requires luring the victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow; it cannot be performed by cross-site request forgery alone, which reduces practical likelihood. ## Patched version The fix binds the OAuth check cookies to the provider/authorization flow that created them, so a callback cannot consume a check value minted for a different provider. Upgrade to the first releases containing this fix (pending; this advisory will be updated with exact patched versions before publication). ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately: - Enable PKCE (`checks: ["pkce"]`, in addition to `state`/`nonce`) on every provider that supports it; PKCE blocks the practical code-swap variant because the attacker cannot observe the relying party's verifier. - Avoid offering logged-in account linking across multiple providers where one provider is lower-trust or attacker-observable. - Treat `events.linkAccount` as sensitive: add audit logging, user notification, or out-of-band confirmation so that any unexpected link is visible (defense-in-depth, not a root-cause fix). ## Credit Reported by @Nadav0077. Thank you for the responsible disclosure.

References: https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73419, https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/pull/13469, https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/5bca2399a79ba8d116ca5179b4b1ebcd152e7f05, https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/9f7a97fade9b1319bb9ac19fc9828d62e0a2a852, https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth, https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/@auth/[email protected], https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/[email protected], https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/[email protected]